

MEDITATION ON BITBURG  
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MG: ...May 21st.

DE: 1985. Ok. Meditation on Bitburg. Now to start with, uh, you know, Steven Rosenfelt raised the issue, you know, what was the relation of the Holocaust to Bitburg, \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_. And I'm gonna ask you to say briefly what the effects were...

MG: I think the relationship is that when a human being feel the necessity to identify an enemy and exterminate such an enemy, whether that enemy is within your national boundary, as the Jews were, in Germany, or whether that enemy is the Soviet Union, that if one then in a certain way abandons what we think of as good, civilized, non-barbaric standards of good and evil, that when that abandonment happens, and all stops are pulled out, that you then exterminate that enemy with the ferocity and with a disregard for what we call, you know, collateral (?) \_\_\_\_\_. Meaning the slaughter of innocents, which is non-combatants, which is mothers, young children, and old people and sick people and so and so and so and so. That the willingness to do that, and to carry that out whether it is a holocaust against you know, a small group within your own country, as with the Jews, or whether it's another country, like the Soviet Union or they with us, that this is of the nature of holocaust. A holocaust is a burnt offering; that's all it is. And what it means is to me that it goes beyond anything even to be described under "just war" theory and that is by god not only comparable, but I don't see a significant difference. One difference is that I suppose you would say there's a difference between actually taking the responsibility of "I am going to wipe out this enemy, exterminate this enemy, and I take, you know, full responsibility for my intention, for my will, for my doing it," between that and saying "I will only make preparations to risk such a holocaust," that that's the difference between

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the holocaust and what Hitler was doing and what is now going on by way of preparation. And that's how I relate the two. I will only add to that that this question: "Why the apathy then?" raised by Kohl and Weiseler (?) is what I'm saying is a question not to be asked right now, primarily, or solely, by Germans to Germans, but by everybody to everybody. And that's what...that's how I relate. Alright?

DE: Very good. Walter (?) might want to get into that.

MG: Do you want it?

DE: No...

MG: 'Cause I get \_\_\_\_\_ it and be quite happy. \_\_\_\_\_.

(INAUDIBLE EXCHANGE OF COMMENTS)

DE: Uh, ok, the subject here...(INAUDIBLE). Um, why do you think it's important to raise, specifically the Nazi \_\_\_\_\_, at this time.

MG: At this time, alright. Because the horror that people feel- not simply Jews, but people...I think you underestimate, by the way, how much horror has been felt and is being felt about the Nazi stuff as raised by the Bitburg issue, that that got focused. I say, in my thing that Bitburg became a kind of moral microcosm for what's really the most important issue at stake, as far as I know, in the world, and that is that people have that horror available about the Nazi holocaust, and what I would like to do is make a bridge so that the denial and self-deception and stuff that has gone about the current preparations, which risk a holocaust far beyond that, that I would like that to connect with that horror, so that people would resist this one! That's all. Does that make sense?

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DE: Mhm. Do you think \_\_\_\_\_ essential in effect? Can you imagine mobilizing sufficient horror without drawing the Nazi experience?

MG: I'm not sure. Essential, I would say no, because the horror \_\_\_\_\_, people manage to feel, even with such a core movie as The Day After, but temporarily, you know, it's all closed down, as far as I can see.

DE: & MG: Discussion of food.

DE: Ok. A final, the next question is how would you expect this interpretation or this connection to be consciously resisted once made? In other words, if you were arguing against it, I could ask \_\_\_\_\_ -

MG: I can tell you what they've been.

DE: Say if you were arguing against it, how would you argue?

MG: Ok. I would argue against it by saying that the preparations that are now being made certainly by us, in the United States- I don't know about the Russians but certainly by us- that it's precisely to avert such a holocaust that these preparations are being made and that if we manage to keep stronger than the Russians and, you know, really scare them enough so that they won't try any monkey business, like a first strike on us, or something like that, because they'd get it in space, that if we managed to keep the superiority, that that is probably the surest way to avert this holocaust we're talking about and that, in fact, please notice, that for the last forty years, there has been not only no nuclear war but no WWII even, of any kind.

DE: No WWII. No replay of WWII.

MG: No world war...I meant to say no replay of WWII, in a conventional WWII.

DE: Well doesn't that both in effect and intent mark it up... an enormous difference uh from the ethical structure and the practice of the Nazi's?

MG: Well, no, because I think that when one is risking- and I see an escalating risk nowadays- when one is risking a magnitude a holocaust that goes way beyond what the Nazi action perpetrated, I think one has to look at...are you here? One has to look at the risk level as the key item far more than the anything that has happened to date, because if you look at the history of how come there have been 40 years of peace, and if you look at the fact that it's only in the three...last three or four years that the Russians have even come close to having rough parity with our ...um, you can't say that, you know, it's been the nuclear deterrance thing that has kept everything so nice and peaceful, up until now, because the situation's changed, even in the last three or four years; it's getting worse all the time.

DE: "Wouldn't people who defend our nuclear policy that it is precisely the discrepancy in our capabilities...in other words, the enormous superiority of the U.S. that did insure the peace adequately? And they might agree with you that the assurance is very much less as the parity has recently appeared?

MG: Well, fine, except that such a discrepancy is not duplicateable anymore because the difference between having, let's say, 4 ICBM's and whatever we had it in 1962, that that discrepancy is of a different order from the present this, you know...

DE: Well, they would agree with the reliability of this,  
\_\_\_\_\_, because it is very much less now.

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But that brings up another question which is whether there was, or is, any alternative, or a better alternative. In other words, to judge this both ethically and practically you do have to consider alternatives. And um, this might appear you know, regrettable, unreliable, tragic course, and yet a necessary one that does not imply uh does not imply \_\_\_\_\_ efforts.

MG: Well, I will tell you. What I always think of at this point, and it is actually heard from you, uh, from Herman Kahn's mouth, at the Rand Corporation, about you know, you know nothing's wrong with killing a million people, but it's wrong to do it without thinking about it.

DE: Oh. It's interesting. You've correctly quoted that, but knowing your transcript, you said-

MG: What did I say?

DE: You said, you said "a quarter of a million people," oddly.

MG: That was typed wrong.

DE: Oh. Typed wrong? (INAUDIBLE) ....several times, "a quarter of a million people," which is also, \_\_\_\_\_.

MG: (INAUDIBLE)

DE: Between uh...you said that to one of those people. But that it's got to be wrong.

MG: I have never said it wrong!

DE: Yeah...hahaha.

MG: Many things I've said wrong; I don't think that one.



I bet you're still hungry.

DE: So that you're saying that in terms of scale that it's uh...

MG: Right. Right.

DE: What if it were down to 10 million?

MG: Alright. That gets to be a question. And I think, what if it's down to one? You know?

DE: One person.

MG: One person. No, really, you know.

DE: Well that's what...that's what...(INAUDIBLE) ...what if we could save everyone by torturing one child to death. But, um, I feel ten million is interesting. Actually, ten million is the scale that was at, for over the first ten years. Of the nuclear world. So \_\_\_\_\_ basically the A-Bomb \_\_\_\_\_. The problem arose ethically...

MG: No, no I'm not.

DE: With the H-bomb?

MG: No.

DE: That case could be made.

MG: No.

DE: (INAUDIBLE) But anyway...

MG: The problem is...

DE: ...the use of scale, but...

MG: I'm...no, it's not only the scale. It's not only the scale. It's the slaughter of the innocents; that's what it is. And whereas, for instance, yesterday, Drew Porter, who drove me down here, said about Bitburg, which I was talking to him about...as well as I talked to everybody else...uh, he said, "Well, I think, Reagan should really, if he wanted to...if he was seeking redemption, he should have gone to Dresden . I said, "Oh really Drew? You think that may be high altitude ...volume wasn't so great...even." He said, "That's right. That is where he should have gone, to Dresden." He said, "He may have a good heart. His heart is in the right place." He said, "But his judgement isn't always so good."

DE: If that's true, that would involve not forgiving Germany,

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MG: Oh yeah. That was to get us to be forgiven. Yes, oh absolutely. I mean that he should be seeking redemption by going really...

DE: Because no American has gone to any such place, including Hiroshima, no American official.

MG: That's right. I said, "What about Hiroshima?" He wasn't so sure about that, by the way.

DE: The closest to it in the Western World is the Pope going to Hiroshima.

MG: What did he do there, I forget.

DE: Well he talked about, quite well, about the threat of technology and war to humanity. Evil. And he talked, this Pope, and of course, um, Lilly Bryant's (?) falling to his knees when he was chancellor of Germany, and uh...(INAUDIBLE)...but

no American official has ever visited Hiroshima before, let alone in a spirit of apology. Let alone, any of the bombing sites of WWII in Germany. Um...interesting. Well! You see, you are ...one way of interpreting what you're saying, though, is as you say, I think, a question of scale (?). Uh, and that slaughter of the innocents on this scale, even in retaliation or even as a contemplative risk or a threat, is totally unacceptable. And you might go so far as to say that it was condemnable on the level of an \_\_\_\_\_. On the latter point, I think you were trying- given the historical way in which this evolved- let's say, very, very few people...

MG: Which evolved?

DE: ...the, the trip. (?)

MG: Oh the nuclear thing?

DE: Yeah. ...evolved, uh, you find very few people agreeing, or prepared to agree with you. On the question of rather it is condemnable, or rather it is wrong, even as a retaliation, you could...or regrettable, I think you could find a lot of agreement, including in the Pentagon, in the sense of ...I think that people...about as many people are prepared to say that our retaliatory plans are excessive, if they come to know what they are, when you know what they are. Unnecessary, excessive and even wrong.

MG: Yes, you see Drew, for instance, attacked the in-discriminate weapon.

DE: As...as I can agree, there is excessive secrecy in the Pentagon; too many things are classified. That's essentially 100% of the system agrees to that; I think that everyone agrees to that.

MG: What, that too many things are classified?



DE: There isn't anyone who will say that we don't classify...  
the Pentagon does not classify too many pieces of information.

MG: Is that right?

DE: Yeah. I mean, that's a truism. Period. And there isn't  
anybody who wouldn't say that...almost no one who would say  
that we don't kill too many people, uh, in our retaliatory  
plan, because we...if they're carried out, if they were carried  
out wholly, effectively, the Russians would not exceed in  
...by evacuation. \_\_\_\_\_ there are few people  
who can imagine that despite our plans they won't actually  
kill many people because the Russians will all have  
evacuated and uh it won't be like that. But...

MG: Drew argues, and I wanted to ask you if it was true...

DE:...if my predictions are...I think there is almost no one  
who would say that it is necessary to kill, let us say, 200  
million Russians, uh, \_\_\_\_\_...

MG: He argues with our present precision, I mean, technologically,  
that we can manage to really target only military projects.  
Is that true?

DE: Not really. Uh, because, see, well, it depends what  
what state or what state of the art he's looking at.  
If he's saying our most accurate weapons, right now, if  
wedded to very small, penetrating warheads, which didn't  
cause fall-out, which has not been done but which can  
conceivably be done technically, in current state of  
the art...uh...then you could uh hit...you would still  
kill civilians, because some would certainly go astray.  
I mean there is no such thing as absolutely accurate weapon,  
absolutely reliable weapon. And some civilians, in any  
case, would be killed by the \_\_\_\_\_. But  
the fact is, so you could, with current accuracies,

current warheads, kill predominantly military targets with small civilian casualties even by WWII standards. But that has no relation to any of our planning, let alone what we actually have. I mean, nobody is proposing \_\_\_\_\_, let alone doing it.

MG: Ok. I didn't mean to throw you off with that. Go ahead.

DE: What I'm referring to is many of the military targets, by any standard that they...by the narrowest standards, many of the Russian military targets are in the midst of population. So, in terms of current stockpile weapons, you can't separate them into ...it's also true, though, that in terms of current state of the art technology, you could build weapons now, without any technical advances that would separate the targets from their surrounding population. \_\_\_\_\_ . Pershing could do that.

MG: Is that right?

DE: Yeah, with a small warhead, if its guidance system were \_\_\_\_\_. What I was saying that the ...everybody, as I say, agree that to kill a hundred or two hundred million people is not necessary. It's wasteful; it's excessive, and in fact it is wrong. It should be changed, to some degree. I say I don't think they would feel the sense of urgency about that that is implied by saying that is equivalent in horror to the Nazi holocaust \_\_\_\_\_. But the urgency of changing it wouldn't be very great, but it would be something. And especially when we recognize that it could go beyond one hundred million to nuclear winter by current plan, \_\_\_\_\_. That is probably triggering some shock, because they not only perceive that as wrong but as necessary to change somehow. And that will be not entirely \_\_\_\_\_, some impetus, now, for these new warheads, the \_\_\_\_\_ warhead, the \_\_\_\_\_,

the \_\_\_\_\_ smaller weapon, that will cause less chance of burning the cities to the ground, but will cause nuclear winter. So if killing a hundred million people unnec...extra, unnecessarily is probably not enough to cause...as a risk, is not enough to cause people to change things \_\_\_\_\_. Going from a hundred million to uh three, four billion unnecessary...

MG: I was gonna say how about three hundred million? Six hundred?

DE: No, no, none of that would do it, but uh but going to billions, because of nuclear winter, will do it, probably. There will be some change, although not enough to avoid nuclear winter, by the way, but just work at it! Ha ha ha... you can't make a difference, but least they will invent... make some \_\_\_\_\_ in that direction. Depending on how hard it turns up...\_\_\_\_\_, if it's as easy to cause it as Sagan suggests it might be then they'll never avoid it. Ha ha ha. But if it's somewhat harder to cause, I mean, they get to a point where they don't have to cause it. But see, where I think though that you're current perception, you have arrived \_\_\_\_\_, which is like my father's, which I have, actually, \_\_\_\_\_ and I have it. I mean it follows very reliably, haha, that the um...

MG: That the average won't...

DE: Yeah, yeah. But beyond readers, \_\_\_\_\_ um, it is a ...it's...those members of the public who perceive what the Nazis do...had...did...and intended and did, as being \_\_\_\_\_ completely horrible, totally condemnable, not \_\_\_\_\_, will nearly all of them, however, would be able to find a justification for the current level of nuclear weapons.

MG: \_\_\_\_\_.

DE: Well yeah, it has two aspects. It's partly that it's a risk but also in terms of intent. It's the \_\_\_\_\_ and Rosenfelt \_\_\_\_\_, that the motive of deterrence of nuclear attack, that nuclear attack, uh, justifies the existence and the threat of these weapons. On the basis of beliefs which have essentially nothing to do with Nazi beliefs, which respect to the treaties. (?) And motives which have nothing to do with those Nazi intentions with respect to the treaty. (?) And that's the ...it's a belief structure and an ethical structure that has nothing to learn from the Germans really, and essentially...

MG: I see, you mean that part is essentially...

DE: Now you say but it involves the possibility of carrying out massacre and ...

MG: Yes, in support of what you're saying...

DE: ...now it clearly does.

MG: ...Drew said yesterday, "I would rather risk a nuclear war, than risk being part of the Gulag."

DE: Yeah well that's essentially from \_\_\_\_\_. But that's a little different but it is not too different.

(INTERRUPTION FOR PHONE CALL)

DE: See you're...the question you are raising is "Does not the scale of the violence project as a possibility, meaning that..." ...practices, old practices...

MG: The word "risk" is key in every sentence.

DE: Yeah, the risk, \_\_\_\_\_, but that old practices of coercion no matter what the intention, have to be...cannot employ nuclear

weapons...

MG: Right. You mean old from other wars.

DE: Yeah, previous. Uh, because the scale here is just too great. Now, anyone can see that the scale is enormously raised by nuclear weapons and it will inevitably have an indiscriminate character both in threat and practice.

MG: Indiscriminate is a very important word.

DE: Both in threat and in practice. But, let me ask you, what would a decent, non-Nazi person looking in \_\_\_\_\_, say to that? Why they \_\_\_\_\_ supporting the policy of

MG: I'll tell you what Peter said yesterday when he was on that side of the discussion. He said, "Look, in previous history in wars people have been wiped out, been exterminated. Take the American Indians, for example. Right?" I said, "Quite right." And so he said, "Really, you know, it's not that it would be for the first time that a people has been wiped out, and wise people throughout the ages, you know, Buddha and Jesus and this one and that one have been trying to struggle with this problem, ethically."

DE: Of course one could say, "It has happened." Just as the Holocaust happened. It doesn't prove that it is necessary, justifiable or they endorse it. I mean are we glad the Indians are wiped out? Do we regard that as, you know, as something to reproduce?

MG: No, he was answering me when I said that the stakes have never been this high.

DE: Well, alright. But we're all in the position of the Indians now; he could agree to that. So that makes a difference. So what would he say to that?



MG: I'm not sure.

DE: Well, think about it. He...he...let me come back to the point of deterrance. How would you, if you were, just as a debator if you like, \_\_\_\_\_, put yourself in the position of these people, how would you justify deterrance despite the obvious fact that if it had to be carried out, it's uh...it would lead to a slaughter that was deplorable and certainly greater than had ever occurred before?

MG: Because the risk is ...that this risk is preferable to the risk of living "under the Russians." It's a question of which risk seems the more appetizing to a given person.

DE: That is interesting. That's one answer, by the way, and it is a common answer and I think by the way it is the answer at the heart...it's one of the two answers at the heart of the justification in weapons. I would give a little primacy to the other one, come to think of it. You've mentioned it earlier.

MG: Which one, tell me.

DE OK, just that aside from living under the Russians, this is the way to avoid dying by the Russian hand.

MG: Oh yeah, I thought we took that one for granted, that it avoids war.

DE: Avoids war. And to say that is...you can say "Yes, but this is an unacceptable way of avoiding war." What would the answer to that be?

MG: I think the answer is "I don't see what other option we have."

DE: That's right. That there is...that's it. There is

no better way. There is...any way which has less chance of avoiding war, cannot be better because the nuclear war is so terrible that something is more likely to lead to nuclear war could not be better, whatever ethical justification you gave for it. And uh, I think you might tend to agree with that, by the way. In other words that, a course of behavior or being, which you have to agree had a higher chance of leading to nuclear war, could not be regarded as ethically \_\_\_\_\_able.

MG: No. Yes, I would have to agree with that. Ha ha.

DE: To resist that would really be to really use the higher risk of nuclear war in the service of some purpose, which is what we are reluctant to do here, ethically. In other words, avoiding nuclear war does have to be seen as something like an absolute goal...I should say "all-out" nuclear war. And nuclear winter, let's just say, that kills everything- regard that as a kind of absolute goal. And see, on this other... not everyone would totally agree with that, because some would pit not living under the gulag as worth some risk of nuclear winter, so that would be a controversial position.

MG: That's right, that's right. Worth the risk of nuclear winter, the risk.

DE: Well the higher risk, heightening the risk.

MG: Right, right, right.

DE: That would..that literally says now...but that that would be a minority position and could easily be arguable and perhaps persuadable, even for instance one of the most of conservative of Catholic Bishops, in the or Cardinal Cleril (?) \_\_\_\_\_, found himself saying, after his testimony before the Senate Foriegn Relations Committee, uh, in which he opposed the use of nuclear weapons even in retaliation in the \_\_\_\_\_,

the conference of Bishops. He then gave a speech, shortly after that, where he was elaborating on that and said that even living under Soviet tyranny, as in East Europe, was not as bad as nuclear war, because, which is the essential government \_\_\_\_\_. Because then he simply said, that A) people do live under it and future generations are possible...there is the possibility of salvation under this regime. People can understandably a little bit, but he implied that they can live useful, happy lives under the circumstances. But above all it is not forever. And the basic judgement is the point that Sean made...

MG: \_\_\_\_\_

DE: ...that almost no conditions of torture, you know, of a large part of humanity, for a given generation or for some small number of generations could justify the wiping out of the whole future, and \_\_\_\_\_. And that is what at stake here. So the position that it is worth risking total extinction in order to avoid a certain state of affairs, politically, for a given generation of humans...

MG: Even a small percentage of that.

DE: Let alone a small percentage, but even if you thought world-wide, if you reflect on it, is not a justification for extinguishing, for heightening the risk of extinction. Certainly for doing it, you know, as a definite thing. If it comes down to whether it's worth some risk, you get more and more agreement with the possibility of risking that the less the risks seem to be. After all, most people would not agree with \_\_\_\_\_ Communism \_\_\_\_\_. You could not torture a single child for...to save all of humanity.

MG: That drove me crazy, that discussion, by the way.

DE: Ok. The point then is deterrence, as Rosenfelt says, what keeps, I think, most people and more people, from accepting the precise position you put out here, is this feeling that although the kind of deterrence, or coercion, which was involved in deterrence, the threat and the risk of this kind of violence, is ...raises problems of indiscriminate slaughter, which is bad in itself, and does this on enormous scale, a vast scale, which makes it unprecedented, which is unprecedented and third, that it is decreasingly reliable...all of these being true...

MG: Right, I don't think people accept that at all.

DE: They don't, they...well, they're...the fact is that the polls show, uh, a definitely increased fear of nuclear war.

MG: Oh yeah? Even lately?

DE: Well yeah, in the last few years, of nuclear war.

MG: Over the last few years, yeah.

DE: Despite the fact that they claim the deterrence is much \_\_\_\_\_. So they see all these reasons for rejecting this kind of coercion. But they also see, at least, the prospect of nuclear war started by others as nevertheless justifying this coercion in a new way, in the sense that there is no alternative. That there is a new unprecedented necessity for this kind of thing, that simply never existed.

MG: I'm sure that that is what Steve would say.

DE: So, now deplorable and regrettable and tragic as the prospects of following this approach appear to be, it nevertheless is "optimal." It is necessary. It is thereby justified. And it in no way relies on a set of values and this judgement is made by people whose values have no relation to those of

Hitler's racism, at all. Uh, people, let's say, in other words, who would not accept this kind of violence in any other circumstances or in a circumstance in which it were \_\_\_\_\_ at all...

MG: Except that they identify the Russians as "the enemy." Otherwise, why is there a problem? Why don't we just burn up all our nuclear weapons today? The Russians would not have to have nuclear weapons if we hadn't any. Meaning what if...

DE: Well now that is not true. I mean, they don't believe that and it is not true.

MG: What?

DE: They certainly...because that is the other problem you see...not only do they see the existence of nuclear weapons of a hand of an unfriendly and powerful nation as compelling deterrence and so forth, um, on the basis of ethical principles that, as I say, I will assert, have nothing important to do with Nazi principles, I must say, but they also...

MG: You mean it's defensive.

DE: Yeah, well it is to produce. It is based on an absolute abhorrence let us say, of nuclear war, but a belief that there is no comparably effective way of preventing nuclear war.

MG: Ok that is the difference.

DE: And if supposing...

(TELEPHONE)

DE: I mean if this were the whole story, what I'm saying...ok, so they say there simply is no alternative to this as a



means of preventing nuclear attack. And they...this...I am not saying now that this is necessarily true, mathematically true; I am saying that it is sufficiently persuasive to enormous numbers of people, to the great majority of people, uhm, who in turn do not necessarily have any important relation to Hitler's...Hitlerarian ethics.

MG: Yes, you are making the big distinction.

DE: That follows that Hitlerian ethics and world view are not essential to a wide-spread support of nuclear weapons and could be exclaimed without the...

MG: Wait a minute. There's something wrong in what you just said.

DE: I am saying that the the justification can be made compelling can appear compelling to sufficient people, to get this stuff produced, people who do not have any important similiarity to Hitler's views. That it follows that it is not the case that Hitlerian type views are necessary to the existence of nuclear weapons or that the existence of nuclear weapons proves Hitlerian views in any particular individual who is part of the program.

MG: Wait. There's a ...one thing wronog with what you are saying. Which is it doesn't mean there is an identity between these people's views and Hitlerian views.

DE: No I'll go further and say that there is, by the way, one correspondence which is important and I think we can talk about it. That is, of course, the willingness to contemplate the threat and even the risk of massacre of an instrument of policy. However, however, under the certainly limited circumstances, under which they might find it justifiable, are so limited, so wide-spread...and so wide-spread in the nuclear era..under the circumstances of the nuclear era, that I would

say from that point of view, which is not the whole story, that there is...from the point of view of these people who support it, what we're talking about, they really have very little to learn about their situation...I'll just tell you that the fact is that the deterrence in the form of deterring Hitler, possesses nuclear weapons.

MG: Say it again.

DE: Deterring the Hitler who possesses nuclear weapons from using those weapons by possessing them oneself, is a... sufficiently different from the motives that led...that motivated Hitler's holocaust, that there isn't a lot of lessons to be drawn back and forth between them. Very few people that it is essentially the same, if you believe that. And I...in any case, nor I would say, need they believe you, should they believe you, I don't believe you. Although I can recognize the position and contemplate it but I don't share it. Ah...but here's the point. The fact is, deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States has never, among the critical decision makers, shaped or determined the decision to develop nuclear weapons, at all. It has not or even influenced the type of nuclear weapons heretofore. It has never the scale of the program. It does not affect the planning for the use of those weapons, nor the actual use of those weapons in combat, in Hiroshima, or in threat situations. Although deterrence, in that sense, the deterrence of a Hitlerian enemy who possesses nuclear weapons has in fact justified the whole program in the eyes of most people developing the weapons and working with it and supporting it as tax payers and everything else, so that their ethical framework, I would say, is not very similar to Hitlerian ethics or world view. The fact is that their perspective has not been the perspective that has actually determined the program. The program has in fact been determined by ethics which are ...which have many very essential points of similarity both to the view of Hitler's leaders and of Hitler's followers. And there

is a lot, in fact, to be learned from the Hitler experience, both from the perspective of targets other than Jews, and the perspective of people who don't want to be Nazi's...but who are not German. There's a lot for Americans to learn, there's a lot for non-Jews to learn from the Hitler experience. But that is because the secret history and the actual motives that have shaped this program are not what the public and most of the participants have believed them to be, including most of the people at Livermore. So the points to be made, then, are, in my opinion, well, that's the basic point.

MG: Ok, now, I think that is marvellous by the way.

DE: Yeah there are differences and there are differences that are worth noting even in that sense, even \_\_\_\_\_. And there are a great many similarities. You can discuss the whole problem in all its contexts without raising the Nazi experience. I actually did that at Irvine, I did it most of my course of Harvard and thus you avoid confronting the Zionist shibboleth of the uniqueness of the Holocaust experience.

MG: You mean ...advantage to do it...\_\_\_\_\_...

DE: Yeah, it can be a great disadvantage and I would say briefly and that it is a great disadvantage.

MG: That the disadvantage outweighs the advantage.

DE: In order to see the genuine similarities from which lessons can be drawn...

(END OF SIDE I)

DE: ...characterizing the atmosphere around Livermore, there is a kind of boys' club humor that goes on, that would characterize more as an apparent desire to shock Margaret, but on the other hand it doesn't happen only because Margaret is there, but rather it is characteristic of them proving their...I suggested toughness in the sense of medical students who are learning to be disrespectful or unawed by the human body, by pain, by blood.

MG: No squeamishness.

DE: A lack of squeamishness which enables to do what must be done to operate competently and efficiently in the physical presence of human suffering, pain, blood; in their case, of course, that is not what is involved, but rather figures on paper that foretell later massive blood and suffering, on a scale though, that typically breaks through abstraction for most people or can break through which they demonstrate as if they actual blood were there and nevertheless what were called, what are sometimes called the "hard decisions," or the "tough decisions." The word "hardness," as in tumescence, and toughness comes up repeatedly. When Sorenson was being ...was disqualified as head of the CIA under Carter, because he had given an affidavit in the Ellsberg trial, or revealing that he had taken large amounts of classified information from the government in order to write his history of the Kennedy years, as has every other official who has written memoirs, uh, that affidavit essentially was used to disqualify him from being head of the CIA. Uh, Warnkey (?) was subject to a similar charge when he came up as head of ACTOV (?) in the same hearing season, because he had...it is his copy of the Pentagon Papers that I copied at the Rand Corporation, but he pre-empted that challenge by making it part of his formal statement, showing that he was very different from, you know, that he did not condone what I had done and that he had been disassociated from it and so forth.



Nevertheless they got him too. It was, by the way, the effort to get Wornkey, above all, in that same season, Congressional season, in which the link between the religious conservatives, the fundamentalists, the religious right, and the neo-conservatives, Commentary, and the Committee for Present Danger, and so forth, that formed. That is when Vigory formed the mailing lists that comprised both of these two elements and there was the political alliance on which the Reagan movement was founded. It was after...it started then in a Committee to Protect National Security or something like that, which was addressed to preventing Paul Wornkey from being \_\_\_\_\_. Which later went into action against the Panama Canal treaties in further form ...forged this alliance. But, as I say, it also came to play against Sorenson, and when Sorenson withdrew from nomination, was withdrawn from the nomination by Carter, after he had wanted to be head of CIA, the New York Times essentially approved this withdrawal...ironically since the Pentagon Papers were at stake here...but the New York Times didn't focus on the fact that he had proved unreliable with secrets, but on his whole record which included conscientious objection. And uh that he had been a divinity student, earlier on, and a pacifist, all of which had changed of course, but nevertheless this background raised the question, according to the New York Times, as to whether he could be relied upon "to make the tough decisions," as head of CIA. Now of course we are not talking about tough decisions about intelligence \_\_\_\_\_ telling the President toughly what he doesn't wanna hear, you know, the realities of the situation. We are talking, of course, about the real job of the head of CIA which is to overthrow democratic governments, assassinate leaders who get in our way who may have been elected. And so forth. Corrupt unions...

MG: Torture.

DE: Torture, run paramilitary operations which lead to the decimation of our mercenaries as well as their victims, as in



Laos. These are the tough decisions which we want made, and we want them made secretly, secretly from us, which is why the issue of classification and secrecy is so critical. Indeed, why we would want a special allegiance to secrecy in the head of CIA, since his job is to do things that must be kept secret, above all from us. Obviously not from their victims. Uh, precisely to preserve our own image of ourselves as non-genocidal. Or as dedicated to self-determination and in some cases the democracy, and therefore as Goldman would point out, secrecy, a special secrecy is essential, or, either our self-image would be challenged, or we would have to give up some of these practices which are in our self-interest. Um, so the tough decisions. Such as overthrowing Allende in Chile. The ...again the word "toughness" appears in the Himmler quote: "We've all seen the bodies, five hundred bodies, a thousand bodies. That we have seen these things and have, with a few exceptions caused by human weakness, remained decent." That is, as one translation puts it: "That has made us hard." That is a page of glory in our history that has never been written and is never to be written. "Hard." Um...again, Himmler's point was that carrying out the Holocaust was precisely an example of a tough decision, which, as he said, over and over, was difficult for Germans, precisely because they were humane. Himmler himself opposed blood sports and opposition to Goering opposed fox hunting and stag hunting and cruelty to animals. And of course, he put a good deal of emphasis on \_\_\_\_\_. By the way, is not irrelevant, notice that the Holocaust, if we ask what ethics and what world view led to the Holocaust and how Germans went along with it... this is the question Weiseger (?) asks, uh, I think one could get a somewhat misleading impression from his speech. He does say, correctly, that there was enough there to raise questions as to what was being done about the Jews, and if people had followed up those questions, or asked them at all, they could have begun to find out what was actually being done to the Jews. In fact, they did not ask the questions or follow up. And he implies that it was purely from

a fear of finding out and being and feeling responsible to oppose it that they refrained from asking the questions. But it's also worth realizing that Hitler did not advertise an intention to exterminate the Jews. I think that is often misunderstood. Now I may be wrong about this and we can come back on this but let me...I would like to go back and actually look at Mein Kampf. Which was what I was referring to.

MG: I think Robert Wake quoted from Mein Kampf, but I could be mistaken.

DE: It is certainly not an overwhelming theme in this sense: that we do know that prior to the war and prior to the depths of the war, which is to say late '41, when they had actually...

MG: \_\_\_\_\_ started in '34.

DE: No, no, \_\_\_\_\_ yeah, but that is the big distinction I'm making. Let me come back to that. I mean, death camps were not started. Uh, the final solution was not adopted as an official...'til, I believe it was December of '41.

MG: That's right.

DE: It didn't begin to be implemented until mid '42. Um, remember that is question...when was Stalingrad?

MG: '40...

DE: '42?

MG: No, between '42 and '44, I think '42.

DE: I think it's probably end of '42. But they had gotten bogged down and stalled in Russia in early as late November of '41, when they attacked in June. By November they're deep in Russian winter and they are bogged down. So interestingly,

and I think it is worth noting, the actual plan to exterminate the Jews, interestingly, doesn't begin until they are confronted with failure on the military front and they have something... they have...they are facing not an unbroken string of victories but on quite the contrary a massive obstacle and frustration... they are already \_\_\_\_\_, if not the portent of defeat.

MG: I have never seen that noted.

DE: I have noted that, but I have never seen it mentioned.

MG: You have noted it before?

DE: If you think of something like this as something that people tend to do when they have a reason to feel potentially humiliated and defeated and frustrated...

MG: Backs up against the wall. (INAUDIBLE)

DE: There's no question. It's often been noted that as the war went on especially in '44 and '45, the completion of the process was consciously seen as a compensation for defeat and as an area where here, at any rate, we can be victorious or conquer something. Knowing that they were going to be defeated. But that's equally true...at... what's never noted is that that's true of the beginning of the process and the ...just as, for example, use of bombing of Germany begins after Dunkirk, not I think coincidentally. We have nothing else we can do...and they had a lot to repay. A terrific humiliation to revenge.

MG: Oh that's a very profound; it runs over everything.

DE: I think I got the idea by reading Cooper's book of genocide, on genocide, which points out how commonly genocide is undertaken as a revenge and compensation, from a humiliation,

usually by somebody else entirely. But then you take...take out this frustration on a weak and available target. Like child beating in general.

MG: I was about to say, has that been tied to individual...? Development by people?

DE: Well everyone notices that it is related to child beating and wife beating, that that's a response to humiliation and work and in life...

MG: No, no, I meant developmentally, as you have done, about the humiliation at the hands of this mother...

DE: What about it?

MG: How that may well be the roots of revenge, particularly in little boys.

DE: Well that is my understanding.

MG: No, but I mean, have you ever seen that anywhere? I haven't.

DE: Well yeah, Alice Miller.

MG: I am saying to tie that to this I have not seen anywhere.

DE: Well Alice Miller relates it, on the personal level, to what Hitler did. The fact that he was beaten as a child, himself. But no, she doesn't, if you mean on the macro level, I'm not sure. I don't think so...I may have \_\_\_\_\_  
uh and so the point I was going to make earlier though, about Hitler, was that the drift of that one forgets first of all, the positive side to his anti-Semitic policies which was the purification of the German race. That was in a process, not just of destruction, but of improvement. The process of progress and perfection. That there was the positive

value in eliminating the Jewish strain from the Arian nations and societies, so that they could achieve their potential for creativity, for unity, for community, for boldness, for martial values of various kinds, all of which were undermined by the subversive presence of Jewish race.

MG: As is now the full conscious aim of everybody working at Livermore on nuclear weapons with regard to the Russians. That the aim is to extricate this source of such inhuman immoral evil, from the face of the earth, so that the rest of us, led, of course by the United States of America, will finally be a really pure, free, "free," is the word of course all the time, and altogether flowering, blooming, flourishing society. That is the conscious stated aim.

DE: Let me come back to that for a moment in a minute. But going back to Hitler, certainly his first goal was to then to eliminate the influence of Jews on the German people, and that had to do...the...the natural, not merely more humane, but the natural instrument for doing that was simply expulsion. A precursor to which was quarantine within society. Remove them...remove them...first you remove them from their positions of influence (SKIP IN TAPE, OR CUT)... What the Germans then saw was a process first of reducing and removing influence of the Jews, in particular of...going beyond that, of striking very hard at inter-marriage, or inter relations...sexual relations, so purify the race, quarantining them, essentially, in short, bringing about apartheid. Achieving apartheid. Uh, keeping in mind, interesting, now is this by the way, one could ask, "Well, shouldn't they have been warned by this?"

MG: Shouldn't who have been warned?

DE: Shouldn't the Germans have been warned by where this was going...the non-Jews, shouldn't the non-Jews have realized where this was going and so forth. Well, apartheid did not exist in South Africa then in that same degree, although in



practice, you know, effectively, it did. Where it did exist, legally, of course, was the U.S. in the South.. And that wasn't just in the 30's or 40's or 50's ...we had legal apartheid in the 60's...What we have now, according to the New York Times, this month, is informal apartheid, no longer buttressed by law in the South, still have seperate restrooms, still have seperate procedures, as well, of course, seperate wage scales...

MG: And by and large neighborhoods.

DE: Yeah in neighborhoods, in the South, and we have the neighborhoods in the North of course, although not the restroom...but uh, as before, so was it Hitler's racial theories that were anethema to us? The United States Republic was not only founded mainly by Virginian slave holders, but was an enormous society founded on slavery until 100 years ago.

MG: You know I still keep repressing that Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson, was a slave holder? I keep repressing it!

DE: And according to \_\_\_\_\_ Brody, couldn't bring himself to free even his mistress because she was his mistress, and he didn't wanna lose that hold over her. And so it is not, in short...

MG: It is not exactly unfamiliar!

DE: ...I mean, when we ask ourselves "How we could possibly be going along with South Africa," you know? South Africa really isn't doing anything that we didn't do legally 20 years ago. That means when these adolescents...when their parents were their age. So, now the same applied over here. And one could ask "Should not the North have boycotted the South?" At that time and so forth? But sure, he wasn't about too...

DE: It was quite astonishing. Moreover, by the way, it's also worth noting, in 1948, rather in 1950, roughly, 35 years ago, I decided not to go into labor union organizing, as my life, which had been my plan for several years, in part because the Northern unions had given up Operation Dixie, which was to unionize the South and they never did that, basically. And had given up, really, trying to expand unionism, and instead emphasized welfare funds and other prerequisites, as part of the Cold War Deal that Ruther and others made with Humphrey and others in the Truman Administration as signing on to the anti-Soviet Cold War and part of an arms' build-up and other things. But part of that was a decision not to challenge the essence of apartheid in the South which was a dual rape (?) scare. And which, after all, applies today to women, as right now.

MG: In North and South.

DE: North and South. Even at Harvard, some professors...            
their salaries, that they happen to have breasts.

MG: You know I swear that when Dorothy said to me, months ago, said, "Do you think they would dare this to a man?" I said, "I really don't think so. And I don't think they have." I have to check it out, what they with me-

DE: Oh with you? They didn't do it to any other person that you know of?

MG: Um, they...yes, they did it with a few more women who are not there full time but I don't think to a man. I have to check it out.

DE: More women? That's interesting, yeah. Ok, well, now, we come back then to...I was saying, no let me finish the point on Germany, that in short, he was heading toward an apartheid system which is not implying extermination, in fact, and which

clearly involved segregation and finally removal, you know, to other areas, but the major...his major point then was not only segregation but ultimately emigration...purifying, removing, removing their influence and then removing them physically from these areas that were to be dominated by Arians. I doubt if it is clear, except maybe very occasionally or tangentially, (INTERRUPTION)...that extermination was even possible.

(INTERRUPTION) In other words, to say that racial theories, or that acts of segregation, uh, and even humiliation, or finally pressures toward emigration, which was cer...after all, remember, which was Eichmann's first official task, and which he said he was always devoted to as the best solution. He said he became a Zionist, and indeed, he believed in Zion. And there is growing a lot of evidence now...

MG: That sounds funny in my mind...

DE: Well, he believed the Jews should go to Israel. On this basis there came to be an alliance, or rather, there were gestures, it didn't work out much, but from the Jewish side, the Jewish fascists, represented mainly by Menachim Begin, and his boss, Ghabatinski (?) saw real possibilities and which they proposed to the Nazi's of a working alliance between them. Both of them believed the Jews should leave Europe and go to Israel and that the Jews were prepared to be agreeable to the Nazi's in certain degrees. After all, they shared many many views with the Nazi's, as has come out now, you see. They had what amounted to fascist beliefs; they believed in hierarchical society, they believed in authority, they believed in tradition, they totally disapproved of the Enlightenment and liberal ideas in general. And...

MG: And the methods of terror, really.

DE: Yeah, Ghabotinski and Begin point out that the only thing you really disagreed about was the social value of the Jews. They had the wrong target, the Nazi's had the

wrong target. But in terms of \_\_\_\_\_ philosophy, they had a lot in common and they both agreed the Jews should go to Israel, and they wanted financial support on the basis...they got-

MG: Hitler and Begin: Partners in Zionism!

DE: They got some backing; specifically, it seems, they got more help...they got definite help in training and finances from Mussolini. Not much from, if anything, from the Nazi's. But they did get help from Mussolini's factions. The Irgun. Well, this is before the Irgun, but \_\_\_\_\_'s idea. And so it was not racism; it was not apartheid. It was a problem for the U.S. and largely a problem for the Germans, as I say. This was part of the U.S. system and always had been. Nor did it lead to extermination, necessarily, see? Um, and actually my...I will look into this, but my impression as of now is that a) there was no explicit emphasis on the idea of extermination, even as a real possibility, as a solution to this and that was in any case, that the preferred solution definitely was the restructuring of society and the elimination by expulsion, by emigration and this is, as I say, the Germans went along with, but a lot of other people did too. Um, the extermination, then, is a definitely second best solution. The emigration having clearly been blocked off not by the Germans, but by other countries that were simply unwilling to allow...the Jews in. And um, ...

MG: Including the United States.

DE: As an aspect of their racism- not just against blacks. "What will we do...what would I do with all those Jews," as the British Foreign Secretary said.

MG: That he phrase that that way?

DE: Yeah, "What would we do with all those Jews?"  
The question of the enormous change in immigration.

MG: \_\_\_\_\_.

DE: Well, you know, we have managed to absorb a lot of Vietnamese  
and a lot of Cubans and probably we \_\_\_\_\_.  
Resilient society we have here. Takes a lot of ruin and  
uh, somebody said to Engels...

MG: Somebody said to Engels?

DE: Oh Engels was uh saying something how to a Manchester  
fellow capitalist, that the capitalist societies seem to be  
heading toward ruin. And he said, "I think you will find  
Mr. Engels, that this society takes a lot of ruin."

MG: Ha ha ha, I love it. Ho ho ho.

DE: And um...ok. So, the actual extermination...one might  
well ask "Why did they go along? With what did happen?"  
which was concentration camps and badges and so forth, and  
inter-racial laws. But uh, but that's different from asking  
"Why didn't they understand that this was going toward extermination."  
In these other cases, it didn't go toward extermination, nor  
did Hitler advertise that...on the contrary, it not only  
was...he not only did not advertise but we have no knowledge  
that he ever made an earlier decision than late '41, that  
this would be the solution. Ok. I would say that there is  
no real evidence of that; at best, there are hints. And  
third, it may well be the case that it was not his actual  
intention. If anybody had that in mind, as people have  
written on this, it was Hitler himself.

MG: Oh I thought you said Hitler.

DE: Well, I say, if anybody...I am talking about the Nazi



movement as a whole. But if anybody had it, Hitler personally may have had it, but I think there is very little evidence of that. And he may have actually made the decision or it may have come to him as a possibility or as a desirability, as late as '41. But uh in any case for the rest of Germans, let alone...actually for the rest of the party, that's just not the goal. For Eichmann it was not the goal. And remember, then, two things. That when the decision was made, it was made very secretly, to such an extent that to this day, there had never turned up a piece of paper with Hitler's name on it, that calls for the final solution.

MG: Is that right?

DE: That led David Irving to write a whole book, suggesting that it was a Himmler plot that had been laid to Hitler, that it wasn't Hitler at all. But there is much evidence that that is not true. Nobody, except Irving, believes that, essentially. But the point is that the basis for that theory is that there is no paper; there is lots of paper, which is by order of the Fuhrer, or with Hitler's name on it, but not with this. It was held very secretly, and the second point is that it was done under wartime conditions. Conditions of secrecy of transport... remember that late '41 is after the Germans themselves have already been subjected not to massive bombing, but to some bombing. The first bombing of Berlin, which led, to the Battle of Britain, led to the bombing of London, was actually in... the first bombing of Germany was right after the fall of France. But the first bombing of Berlin was later that year, in about August. And uh uh after threatening that he would bomb London for about 7 or 8 days, every day, if they continued bombing Berlin, Hitler then turned on the bombing of London.

MG: So when is this?

DE: This is 1940, a year earlier than the final solution. So the context then, of the extermination in a situation

where city bombing has now already gone on on both sides. For a year. And ok, so and indeed, as Pastor Neimellur's ...who went to prison in 1938, because of the persecution of the Jews...it is his judgement at the time and now that the extermination would never have taken place except in the context of an on-going war. That the war, that is to say, the Resistance, the continuing Resistance, was at the price of the Jews, that it made possible the extermination of the Jews, which would not otherwise have been feasible in Germany, and um...So, why does that matter here? Well it bears on this question of what is there to be learned from the Germans? How different are they from us? To think that the Germans more or less consciously or just slightly subconsciously were willing accomplices or passive in the face of the extermination of the Jews is at best questionable or misleading. And really, as a description of the 30's is very misleading. We're reading back into the segregation of the Jews...that's what I meant you say Dakal (?), which was a concentration camp initially by the way for Communists. Communists were the first to be incarcerated, in large numbers, hundreds of thousands. And then homosexuals and others and Jews began to come into pretty soon.

MG: Did the homosexuals precede the Jews?

DE: I think they were about the same time as the early Jews. They were very early. Uh, see the Jews weren't initially defined as political enemies-

MG: When is \_\_\_\_\_?

DE: The first steps with the Jews were to remove them from society, you know, from the high ranks of society. They weren't initially treated as political enemies as the Communists were, but...

MG: How hard that must have been! How do you understand that?

DE: By the way that is another point that bears on the lack of a resistance. I've rarely seen this point made. Why was there no resistance in Germany? I don't know if I've ever seen the following point made. The answer is the resistance was always led, in every one of those countries, by the Communist party. The Communists had been incarcerated in 1933. Communism had been totally extirpated (?). Now why Communists? Well they are radicals, there are revolutions, and they have an underground organization. They are able to deal...see they dealt even underground, to some extent, in bourgeoisie society. So they were perfectly suited to lead a resistance movement. They were organized for it. And and they were national, see? In that respect, they were like the Communists in Vietnam. The Communists never had, in South Vietnam, a larger following than certain other groups. Like certain other sects, the Kao Dai (?) or the Wahow (?) or the Catholics. What they mostly...where they mainly differed from those other groups- and they weren't nearly as numerous as the less organized Buddhists, but where they differed was that they were national; they were in all regions and they had organized...

MG: Weren't the others that you just named?

DE: No, no, the others were all localized. The Catholics had settled around Saigon, of course a very strategic area. They had deliberately settled around Saigon to protect it. The Wahow were in I forget the names of the provinces and anyway the Kao Dai...so they all had local...they were all locally organized...where they were, they were tended to be stronger than the Communists ever were. In fact the Communists could never get, except by accommodation, as we've said, which they did make to some extent...they never got very strong in those \_\_\_\_\_ areas and in that sense, you see, you could say, "Well, the Communists on the one hand had no greater legitimacy than these others, no greater

following;"that was true. Why was it expected that they would do much better in elections if we really allowed them to compete in elections? And the answer was that they were all over the country and also that they had a nationalist perspective more than these others did.

MG: So your answer, then, to my question, why was there no...

DE: And say "Why was there no resistance?" There were no Communists.

MG: Because the leaders were in jail.

DE: Yeah \_\_\_\_\_ly. Remember not only Communists, but Socialists and trade union leaders.

MG: But listen, I mean, before Hitler came to power, the total Socialist and Communist vote totals 40% of the vote, so they were all in jail?

DE: No, but the leaders were.

MG: Oh ok. You mean both Socialists and Communists.

DE: Socialists, oh definitely, yeah. A number of the \_\_\_\_\_emigrates to \_\_\_\_\_ and the rest are in concentration camps, they die. So I've never seen that little point made.

MG: Never, never, never.

DE: After all, Communist resistors in France weren't just anybody; they weren't dentists, on the whole. Except Communist dentists.

MG: For the party right? The party dentist.

DE: So, uh, and that in turn, by the way, is why Germany was seen as the fulcrum after the war, of our anti-Communist efforts in Europe, as a whole. Because, unlike France and Italy, and even England, Germany was the one country without a strong Socialist party, let alone Communist party. Uh, so they were perfectly suited for an economic miracle and ha ha and for rearmament, but for, above all, to be our base, our safe base, to oppose Communism elsewhere.

MG: The Communists are the trouble-makers of the world, is that right sir?

DE: You are giving them a lot of credit, but it does seem real, yeah. And so, remember that even in Vietnam, you see, the key to Vietmin and Vietcong support, there after, was their wartime resistance really.

MG: So we started with the "tough decisions," that have to be made.

DE: Ok, well, uh, so I'm going on by saying, then, that the ...that's...we did get well apart from that. The...one other thing that is worth mentioning, if there...if I had an epiphany and had a couple of course...in one point, where a light bulb went on over my head, of course, one moment was hearing Randy Kieter's (?) talk and the fact that he was going to prison. But one or two days prior to that a light bulb went on over my head when I realized, when I was talking to Bill Sutherland, actually, he's a ...no actually it was George Willowby, who is a Quaker...Quaker from Philadelphia, at the War Resistor's League Convention, putting to him the the need for a resistance to have been made to Hitler, in order to save the Jews, as justifying the violence against Hitler. And as I spoke to him, this light bulb appeared over my head, in the form of the little comic book captions saying, "But we didn't save the Jews of Europe. Violence did not save the Jews of Europe; essentially, they



all died. And it suddenly struck me, that what I had been clinging to as the sufficient obvious demonstration of the possible necessity of violence, was not a very strong demonstration, since it had failed to achieve what I thought the purpose that justified it- the saving of the Jews. That immediately suggested the question to me: "Is it possible that this violent resistance by the English, to which I was referring, was at the cost of the Jews?" And then I went to an expert in the next room, Pastor Nemuller, and asked him if he had ever thought of the possibility that the prolonging of the war, by the British and the Russians, had in fact led to the destruction of the Jews. And he said, "of course. I have always known that." And it was the cost. And that in fact was the moment at which I began to question my basic ideologies, so much because it seemed to me that if it had led me to miss this...to be so wrong on such a central point, all that time, that it needed a lot more questioning. And maybe I had been taking a lot of things for granted, uh, too much here. And I began, in effect, my quest then of the critique of violence. Now this was the same week where I had heard Geanaqui (?) say, you know...no it wasn't...this was in '69...it was a year and a half after that earlier epiphany when I heard Geanaqui say, "I live in a culture that has no concept of enemy." But and so I've begun to read pacifist literature at the point. But an enormous leap forward came at this point when I still had this residual belief. But, what can you say? Violence is necessary here, and so forth. Uh, there can also be no question historically, but that the pursuit of deterrence by the American public, or the support of deterrence, has led to a situation in which we are in far greater danger than we were at the start of this process and far greater danger than we would have been without this process. We would be now, without this process, and um, and if we are destroyed it will have been because of this concept. Nevertheless, I would say the process has evolved as it has, not inevitably, as a result of the pursuit of type 1 deterrence, of the deterrence of nuclear attack, but because it was consciously led

by people who had very different objectives. I would say the danger has not come simply because deterrence has been a persuasive concept and because deterrence has certain requirements, because the actual course of the arms race, in no way reflects any reasonable interpretation of the requirements of deterrence. It reflects entirely different objectives which have been consciously held by the leaders of our policy. And still, you could say, to draw out one more parrallel, to double back again, you can say that deterrence itself has certain...raises certain propensities, you know, is likely to revolve in a certain direction, even if it is not logically necessary. It is likely to be used as a cover for these other objectives, for example, even if it didn't start out that way, which it did. These other objectives are likely to arise. In short, a country that buys nuclear weapons in order to deter attack would be likely to think of using them for other purposes as well, once it had them. Unless it were very strongly deterred itself, as is Britain and France. They are so outclassed that they are not very likely to use their nuclear weapons very widely. Although, if they got in a localized situation like the Falklands, they would think of using nuclear weapons first.

MG: Did I hear that was considered, briefly,...

DE: Yeah. I said it was considered....alleged in a probably correctly alleged to be considered against the Argentine submarines if they'd found it. So, that's what I am referring to. So deterrence is likely to expand to these other...in any case. But in our case, that was not the issue. These other purposes were at the forefront from the beginning. Secretely, again, secretely. And again, there is a great need for secrecy here, for the same reason as in the CIA, because what is being hidden looks so dangerous, so brutal, so genocidal, that it would either not be tolerated by the public and would have to change, or would cause major conflict in the public's own self-image...that they have accepted it.

So either as a favor or as to keep the policy going, it has to be kept very secret, and is kept very secret. If the war comes, as a result of our first use policies, it would be incorrect for some later surviving generation to infer or to focus only on the question "How could the U.S. have accepted this policy?" Because in fact, this policy has effectively been kept secret and has effectively kept from the awareness and thinking and even from investigators of some degree of commitment, as was the final solution in Germany. And so a lesson to be drawn from the Germans is how possible it is, not to say exactly easy, because a great effort is involved, but how effective and how possible it is to keep a modern nation, a literate, newsreading, modern nation from understanding even the basic outlines of our policy. It would be simply incorrect, for example, to suppose that the American country, including its leaders, understands what Nixon's policy was for four years of office in Vietnam, because the fact is they don't, by any reasonable test...they don't know what it was. To this day, ten years later.

MG: Even with Cy Hirsh's book...

DE: Despite books at all. I didn't tell you. If Cy Hirsh said "How could you stand watching the Vietnam retrospectives." He said, "It was as if the Pentagon papers had never come out," and I was about to say, but he beat me to it...

END OF SIDE II.

BEGIN TAPE III

DE: ...nosecone...read Pantex, but of course then they get on top of the missiles or they get in the bottom. There's always another beginning point, you know. And there's always earlier points, like Rocky Flats, the creation...

MG: I was listening yesterday to a technical communicator at Livermore talk about...her department had been \_\_\_\_\_, at Livermore. A lovely young woman who double majored in the History of Science and in Creative Writing. And she was describing to me the kinds of things she has to write about, like how you open a door to a plutonium thing so that people don't get like blown up or hurt or plutoniumized or whatever. There are a million things like that at Livermore. She was telling me different things that had to do with her department, about writing about hazard control. And I must say...

DE: Well see, thanks to the Senate now, there's a whole new field of hazards control that is-

MG: Nerve gas!

DE: Nerve gas, yeah.

MG: What was the score...I didn't catch what the vote was, did you notice?

DE: I suppose that is the cost of keeping the MX down to 50 missiles, is that they have to balance back by giving us nerve gas.

MG: Seems that really bothered Reagan, that the missiles dropped.

DE: I don't whether it bothered him. Again, it's another

disgusting business where none...claimed he was gonna keep it down to 40, but in addition have a ban, or a permanent prohibition, written in, which can only...instead of which a one year...one year...as Reagan says, as McFarland says, it's fifty on the way to a hundred, which is what it is. Oh and so none, and the other things, well they choose to interpret it that way. Well, isn't that totally compatible with the legislation? Well, in some technical sense, yes. You know, but it's not what we meant. We are on record as saying we don't think they should do that.

MG: We don't think that's a good idea.

DE: No, but we chose not to keep them from doing it.

MG: You know he sounds like...I never met with him, but once, but his arms control woman, whose name I've lost, he sounds like that in some way he would really like to see some kind of a real brakes put on this arms race.

DE: McFarland?

MG: No, not McFarland, Nunn. And in fact, they had written to you, some months ago, that at some point when you are back in Washington, on whatever, if you ever do that again, that I thought this was the man worth meeting with. You don't think so?

DE: Yeah, fine, if you'd meet. I don't...you know. So...

MG: Lowell would think \_\_\_\_\_ may be President. President! Last week, two days ago, I told you Speaker of the House. Last night he upped it. I said, "Oh, come on, Lowell, President? That's really not...you know." He said, "Of course it is...he's already working on it. Are you kidding?"

DE: Yeah, it's logical.



MG: He said, "Have you ever heard of anybody that young becoming over seniority the chairman of the House of Armed Services thing?"

DE: Well in fact, he will be the front runner pretty soon.

MG: Well that is what Lowell said. He said, "Listen, you told me last year..." I did, to Lowell, "...that you thought Ashton was one of shrewdest, smartest, slipperiest..." that's when I was furious, you know, with all that stuff. He said, "But you did say, that he's one of the smartest people in Congress." I said, "I imagine he is." He said, "He's gonna be President."

DE: That's probably true.

MG: You think that makes sense?

DE: Yeah, yeah. So, he might even been our last President.

MG: Ha ha ha. You know...hee hee...he might even be our last President. That's a distinction to go down in history, isn't it? Our last President...oh too much. He says brightly, "He might even be our last..."

DE: But you see that is the Livermore humor, and I came out of Rand and so it's laughing, you know, on the brink of the Holocaust and the apocalypse, and one might well ask, by the way, why is it that women on the whole don't want to be searchers (?). (PERHAPS "SURGEONS"?)

MG: I don't find that hard to answer.

DE: I think it's a necessary job. It's for human good, right? Uh, people need it; women, children need it. It saves their lives. It prevents suffering in the long run.

MG: Because women shrink much more, and naturally,  
from inflicting pain. Or drawing blood.

DE: Why?

MG: Because they are more into creating life.

DE: What about the blood though? Maybe it is just the blood  
that bothers them.

MG: No causing blood.

DE: Doesn't it have something to do with menstruation?

MG: I don't think so. Do you think fearing blood, is that what  
you are saying?

DE: Well, it's something to do with blood. Part of the  
awe and mystery of women is that they bleed.

MG: Well, I will tell you what Karl Menger says about that.  
As the reason he respects women so much...his mother was  
a big religious leader. The reason he respects women so much  
is because women have long training in what it is to suffer  
and to bleed, and they know what that is. And therefore,  
they, you know, bend over backwards not to inflict suffering.  
They don't get a kick out of it, that's what he says.  
To squish something, you know? Although, when it is a mosquito,  
I must say...

DE: Given that it is natural to them, you might well  
think that it is easier for them to do, but it isn't. I mean,  
they do it, they survive, they know it isn't that bad...

MG: No, his point was they experience it. And therefore...

DE: Is menstruation that bad? As to make you unwilling to cut anybody?

MG: Oh no, no. I think that is too simple. I think that is some kind of reductionistic \_\_\_\_\_.

DE: But that is what you just quoted.

MG: No, he talked about suffering; he was talking about...

DE: Well is menstruation suffering or not?

MG: No, he was really talking about childbearing and childbirth.

DE: Well then, alright, that is different. Oh, that is the bleeding you are talking about?

MG: Yeah. Oh yeah. No menstrual bleeding...I mean I don't really think in general that women take it all that seriously.

DE: I think women surgeons would not necessarily be mothers, they wouldn't...

MG: Oh not specifically. This becomes something much more profound.

DE: Nor would they have necessarily seen childbirth.

MG: Oh of course they would have, surgeons?

DE: No, ah...

MG: I mean people in medicine? Of course they would.

DE: Well, the men too then. Not more than the men.

MG: No, I don't think that's...that's beside the point.

DE: Well now wait. You said they've seen it, they know what it is. How do they know? More than the men? Isn't a question of...one thing you can say is "They feel a kind of empathy with the person who suffers in childbirth, even in fantasy, that than the men do..." But they are not more experienced in it directly, themselves. The men too have been \_\_\_\_\_. The women, we are talking about, would not necessarily have experienced childbirth nor have seen it, anymore than the men.

MG: That's true. So that's not it. So Karl Meninger is wrong is his developmental sources. And you know what I am doing now? I am going back to your discovery about when do little girls and little boys notice the difference between themselves? And it may be that that is where that empathy...

DE: Well, the little girls are more empathetic with mothers, in all their aspects-

MG: No, wait. That if, in fact, the difference between the little girl and the little boy as first perceived- I saw \_\_\_\_\_ son, and I again asked her how were her data on the difference, as perceived early- 18 months- between little girls and little boys, was not between you have a penis and I don't, but you have a urinating penis and I don't. Meaning something big and powerful and extreme and that that is the difference. So what I am saying is that it may be that from way back a little girl knows how it feels to be powerless and to have somehow have a sense "I have lost something. I don't have something." Maybe. You know what? It is possible- I've denied this for 30 years-

DE: But you've always seen a little boy urinate, right?

MG: Chances are, if you have a brother, sure, or a father? It would be exceptional not to. Most people have siblings, yes.

DE: That they have seen urinating?

MG: Oh sure, sure. Oh yeah. What I am saying is- you are asking me why don't girls become surgeons, and actually, I would think if I were to be really honest, I would say it's much deeper than all of this. That the tendency to be, you know, aggressive, to hurt, to be sadistic, to kill and to wound etc.,etc., is part of the biology of the male child and it has to do with a survival thing and that's why they became the warriors and so on. All this stuff about little girls, you know, are simply taught to play with dolls, and that's why they don't go out and shoot...I'm not saying they can't be taught to, because that is the plasticity of the human organism; it can be taught to do anything. Little boys can be taught to be on many levels, you know, feminine etc. I don't deny that. But I am talking about what is what we used to call in biology the pre-potent potential. Meaning what way does it easiest flow. Where is the least resistance for this water to come down the mountain. You know, that makes a great canyon or whatever. And the fact is, I don't really have a whole lot of questions about it. That at least, in primates, and it seems to be true in most species- there are some exceptions- which I have noted, but that by and large the predisposition in the molecule of the male of the species is to be the fighter and not to be the bearer of children, you know?

DE: Of course fighters still not, you know a surgeon, so we're...

MG: Oh it's very...no, that is first cousin. Meaning the capacity to knowingly do something violent, to do something violent...

DE: Isn't it almost, by the way, though...wait, is it? Or is it, by the way, the ability to operate in the operating room efficiently and calmly without your hands shaking? And



let me point out that what interferes with that is a kind of empathetic panic...the shiver that one tends to feel, when you feel another person's pain, to feel compassion, or if you feel an empathy with it, or if you hear an account of it, you feel shakey...it does something to your adrenalin I suppose . And it's harder...or your mind focuses on it, you can't look at it. It's hard to look at blood; it's hard to look at innards and blood...

MG: That's why most women doctors don't even consider surgery as a specialty. Don't even consider it. It's very rare. I know this from my surgeon patients.

DE: Of course, there are operating nurses who like that. They don't become surgeons, but they like the operating room.

MG: Well, that's a more complex thing and that could be a very interesting complexity there. Who elects to be an OR nurse? You know, that is another question.

DE: Oddly, Carol loved that, by the way, she most enjoyed that, but failed at it. She felt very in\_\_\_\_\_. She was washed out of it.

MG: That could be all for kinds of reasons. I don't know what that is. And the fact also is that there are many many nurses who don't want to work in OR, you know. The ones who do, are an interesting kind...I would suppose, composite, of people who maybe are thinking maybe what will they do is most assist the doctor to make the least violence, by you know, handing things fast and seeing to the anesthetic levels and you know, all that stuff. Meaning as the hand-maiden who is really there, basically, to avert violence and pain. But I don't think we should go at this, because I think the other...

DE: Well we come back, though, to the fact that there is

this feeling that the man...that it is very male and especially masculine, superlatively masculine...

MG: Yes and if you think at Livermore by the way, excuse me for interrupting, that this sense that this is a male society, like you were telling me last time, when I was telling you about the roasting that, for instance, Lowell was doing on Rod: "Hi, you're gonna be the one to throw up. You're gonna be the one to shit in your pants. You're gonna be the one to barf." You know, to be scared and so forth.

DE: This is what, in a mission speech or something?

MG: They're going on a space trip at the end of July. And uh it's supposedly connected...

DE: This year? This very year? Your friends?

MG: Yes! Next month. Yes! Yukie, Rod and Lowell.

DE: She is? Going to go up into space?

MG: Yes! Absolutely! Absolutely. And I said to Yukie, "So what are you really doing up there?" I said, "I can't believe that you're really going up for fun. I can't believe anybody is funding you to go up there just for fun." She said, "Well, that's what we say." So I said, "So, what are you doing?" (INAUDIBLE, CUT)

DE: Just mention here that one comparable thing..that I have been aware of, for instance, that I can operate very competently and calmly with all necessary speed, in a situation of physical danger. No, I thought I could do that; I was glad to have the opportunity to find out, and Vietnam showed that when people were being shot around me I could think very clearly of what we oughta be doing and

what we should do next. My hands didn't shake. In fact, I just got very calm, if anything.

MG: Interesting, but you know that's partly a matter of efficiency. I was just thinking that when I said to you the other day, that when I said I lost an earring, in fact, one of these earrings, that's different. I mean, you just size it up, where were we...da da da da...

DE: But I'm talking about...yes, but to be able to do that when you are being shot at...that is my point.

MG: Oh.

DE: And...

MG: Meaning not to get rattled.

DE: And that's an element for pride for me, just as for these men, it's an element of pride to be able not to be rattled, to be able to think in the face of cruelty or the end of the world, or as a surgeon, in the face of blood and so forth and so forth. Now I, for instance, don't like blood at all, and I suppose I could deal with it, for all I know, but I don't like it at all. I prefer not to look at it.

MG: What did you do with it in Vietnam.

DE: No, there was blood; people were literally shot next to me. Not a lot, but I did see some. I remember guy who was right near me, who was shot in the groin, actually, precisely where I don't know, but he was screaming and it was right in his crotch, and but the point is, say if a blood sample is being taken from me, I don't choose to watch it, I turn my eyes away, even though I am sure I could, if I had to, I would watch it, but...Now, coming back

to deterrence things, it's your...the attitude with which you started, I think, that article, as you said the other day, is that a willingness to use a nuclear weapon, under any circumstances...I think you started your Bitburg article under the assumption that a willingness widely shared in our society to use a nuclear weapon under any circumstances at all, or to contemplate using it, and thus a willingness to possess it or to build it or test it, is as morally culpable, as wrong, as bad, as a willingness to exterminate Jews. And that the questions that are raised about the Germans, then, apply as to how they could have done this or how it was they kept themselves from knowing or thinking about it, apply with equal force to the decisions that our public is making in permitting the testing, the production, the deployment...of these weapons.

MG: And to the question as to how did they deceive themselves and how do we deceive ourselves, and how the Russians deceive themselves.

DE: Now, in one way I am agreeing, because I am saying the Germans, in the thirties, did not really and were not allowed to perceive really, that this was a process of extermination. They are to be judged in their complicity in a process of segregation and new segregation of people formerly respected in a society. Not unlike ...the analogy to which hypothetically would have been the institution of segregation in the South, in the first place, if it hadn't already existed there. But they weren't really accepting extermination. The second point is though, that I think most people, on reflection, would not agree with you that these are equally morally culpable or culpable at all and I tend to agree with them, not with you, on this one, but where is the distinction? Because they are saying there is actually one purpose for which it is alright to...there does exist a purpose for which it is alright

to possess these and even to threaten. That purpose is to threaten retaliation. The second point, which I don't share and which is less widely held but still probably a majority or a large minority of people is a willingness, if deterrence fails, to see major acts of revenge actually carried out, or an indifference to this. Now, I don't happen to share this; many American don't.

MG: Wait a minute. Say that again.

DE: Ok, the question is, what do you feel about actually using the weapons, if deterrence fails, and if you are struck first? There is a wide-spread acceptance of revenge in kind, as a moral principle.

MG: Did most people say, in the poll, that they would or wouldn't do that? In Jan Kolabelich's (?) poll, do you remember?

DE: I think most people said they would not. But I think it was like 60%. A good 40% at least said that they would; it might have been more than that. So, they do accept revenge. In this point, one can say they haven't caught up with the scale of the revenge that is really contemplated here. On the other hand, though, the act that they are revenging, is itself postulated to be you know, of unprecedented horror and violence. So, their general acceptance of the principle of revenge is part of Western society as it is part of Eastern society and Christianity has not tempered that; it is part of Christian society, even though it seems to go against Jesus' gospel.

MG: Oh it does go against it.

DE: It certainly does on a personal level.

MG: It's where we haven't graduated from the ancient



Judeic teaching.

DE: Yeah. Well, where there is an area of ambiguity, which research drives into, is whether Jesus' teaching applies to societies as much as it does to individuals and he isn't explicit in the gospel on this point so they can that there's an ambiguity there.

MG: Does just war theory derive in part from this?

DE: However, I'm saying that just war theory which does not allow for revenge nor does it allow for threatening that which it is immoral to do, actually it doesn't address threat, so it isn't a theory of just threats, actually; that doesn't exist. It should, but it doesn't. The fact then is that the bishops do raise that as a problem...

MG: Whether it is immoral to threaten.

DE: To threaten. And they feel, in their hearts, that it is immoral to threaten, what it is immoral to do. But on this they are not...that is not shared by most of their communicants. Most Catholics and most Americans believe that it is alright to threaten what it would be immoral to do, if you have no better alternative. And that it is even immoral to...and it is basically moral to do certain things in revenge, which they bishops would not at all agree with. They would deny that. But that is not part of popular ethics in this country more than in Germany. So they really do feel then, and I don't think, by the way, this is going to changed very quickly. The only way that...or if it all. It can't be changed just by showing them, you know, waking them up, snapping your fingers and saying, you know, look what you are doing. This is quite deeply rooted, I think, both these ideas. And, um, with a lot of emphasis, that if they apply at all they apply in the nuclear field, because there is no alternative, there is no real alternative.

If people were to accept your position, to come to accept it, starting with me, it would be as a result of training and teaching and evolving. It wouldn't be just confronting existing values or some discrepancy between their existing values and their existing practice. I'm saying that their existing practice is pretty much in line in this respect with their deeply hallowed values. So, what, however, to sum this up, the American people do accept preparation for a massacre and even the carrying out of massacre in one narrow circumstance. And that is to prevent any massacre from occurring, by threatening retaliation in kind. I'm saying that this deeply rooted, persuasive, and even I have to...feel the force of that, basically.

MG: What is the relation of what you just said, for instance, to...

DE: That nuclear massacre, I should say, because that is the one that presents the circumstances where there seems no clear alternative and I can think of no other case, actually, where, a persuasive case can be made that the only way to prevent a massacre or to deter it is to threaten a counter massacre.

MG: Where then do you put the data from reasonably friendly Congress people, who say if the Russian put MG's into Nicaragua, then they would vote for military intervention to overthrow the Sandanista government.

DE: Of course they are not talking about nuclear war.

MG: No massacre. We're talking massacre now.

DE: Well they aren't. They're trying to sell us that ... they're talking precisely "surgical strikes and crates," that just hit the crates on the docks, that don't kill anybody at all, even military equipment, ok? That's what they are

talking. Would it lead to massacre? Yes, probably, and they can see that as a problem, presumeably, but they see it as a problem, not as a desireability.

MG: You mean that is justified as surgical strikes?

DE: Yeah, that's the essence, basically. That's aimed at equipment in crates, not even ready to fly yet.

MG: No, I am talking about Reagan's proposal that the United States go in with a war...

DE: No, Reagan doesn't say that.

MG: ...to overthrow the Sandinista government.

DE: No, no, he has never implied that. No, no. Reagan means to be understood as saying if they put MG's in, we will destroy the MG's.

MG: No, but suppose they don't put them in. What is Reagan's position as to how he is going to destroy the Sandinista government, now. Without MG's.

DE: Well first he hasn't strictly said...he is just coming closer to it, but he hasn't said it that he is prepared to overthrow the Sandanista government.

MG: Right. How does he propose to do that?

DE: With economic pressures, like the boycott, the embargo. With the contra's.

MG: Right, with the contra's. Well what does he want to equip the contra's to do?

DE: The contra's supposedly are hitting economic targets,

alright? Hurting their economy.

MG: Ok. Go ahead. Never mind. I think I have a point here, but never mind; I don't want to pursue it.

DE: Yeah. Anyway, now, where the public differs from their leaders, without knowing it, is that the leaders...our leaders, of both parties, our establishment, have been and are willing to contemplate nuclear massacre in a much wider variety of circumstances in public themselves, and for a much wider array of purposes.

MG: I would prefer the word "risk," to contemplate.

DE: Well, no. In the case of tactical use of nuclear weapons, a number of them have really been ready to do it, if necessary. You can say they're risking that...

MG: Oh, I thought risk is a stronger word than contemplate. Do you want a word like "consider?"

DE: Oh, by contemplate, I meant contemplate doing it, as opposed to risking it. Contemplate risking it. Um, so I don't mean just a fantasy about it; I mean a plan to do it. So they are prepared to do it, to undertake nuclear massacre, in a much wider variety of circumstances. Now granted in most of those cases, what they have in mind, initially, is "a surgical strike." At first, almost any use of nuclear weapons involves some massacre of civilians \_\_\_\_\_. But also, they are all well aware, that it could and probably would lead to some degree of exchange that would involve massacre.

MG: If you drop it near 2 million people, it kills 2 million.

DE: Oh, but they're not talking about 2 million in a first instance. So but they are talking tens of thousands.

So, that's the difference. And that is it. Now, it is a willingness to massacre, a willingness to massacre for a variety of purposes that has shaped the scale of the arms race, the onset of the arms race, the nature of the weapons we have bought, the urgency with which they have been bought, the types of weapons that have been made and so forth. The purpose is on the whole other than the single purpose that the public thinks about, which is the deterring of nuclear attack. Obviously, it is this wider willingness to inflict, let us say, mass capital punishment, that actually has a similarity to the Nazi ideology. Where that Nazi ideology goes to extermination. Remember that the broad movement ideology was one of not extermination, but of segregation, a racialist, segregation policy, like that of the U.S., for which the U.S. was and is famous in the world, except at home. We don't think of that as part of our defining characteristics, but the rest of the world did.

MG: Yes, Pravda did quite a number on the bombing of that house in Philadelphia.

DE: No doubt. So, the ...but the Nazi leaders certainly were open to that, very early on. To making tough decisions. For example, when the SA became an embarrassment in a variety of ways, this being the Brown Shirts, the actual guards of Hitler and basically they were now a threat once the Nazi's were a party, to Nazi influence over the army. The army saw the SA as a competitor. That was a major problem. The SS, this is the origins of the privileged status of the SS, the SS exterminated the SA. That was the night of the Long Knives- have you never heard that expression? In 1934, the night of the Long Knives was when the SS went into the barracks of the- they just wiped them out, starting with their leader who was, at the point, probably, in the movement, the major competitor to Hitler himself and very closely \_\_\_\_\_ (RHONE? ROME?) Was very friendly, a very warm, personal friend of Hitler. He was homosexual,



and a lot of his people were homosexual. That was one of the excuses given for exterminating the SA, and in fact when they went in, they sort of got a lot of them in the aftermath of a homosexual orgy on some weekend or something, drinking and something like that.

MG: No, I didn't know that they went to extermination.

DE: So, there was an example, you see, of a tough decision. This was actually their allies, their mainstay, in that. It had to go, so they wiped them out. They were also, by the way, the radical wing of the Nazi party. They were the more Socialist, more leftist, more worker oriented. I mean, there wasn't a Socialist wing to the Nazi's. That is why they call themselves National Socialists. Had a good ring to it. So, here's then, this willingness to massacre. Notice, by the way, though, that it is under wartime circumstances. Again, in popular ethics, and here is where a change needs to be made but it remains to be made, not at all in people's consciousness, an enormous distinction is made between massacre in wartime and massacre in peacetime and what is thought to be peacetime. Again, you see, the Germans are condemned for the extermination of the Jews, because that is described as a civilian or non-wartime massacre. But one achieves that only by the false identification of the extermination process with what led before that, in the 30's, the peacetime aspect of it, as if it were inevitable and even explicit precursor. In fact, effectively, it was a precursor, but it could hardly be said to be sufficient. It was perhaps necessary to do it that way, but it didn't lead necessarily to this. In any case, certainly not in the minds of the public. In fact, it was a wartime massacre; it was an aspect of wartime.

MG: They would have said that the enemy was not identified as the Jews, but as the Americans and the English and the Russians.

DE: Who would have said that?

MG: The people who say massacre occurs only in wartime.

DE: Yeah right. Again, they are missing one other point, which was that the process in the 30's was precisely of conceptualizing the Jews as an enemy in nationalistic terms.

MG: Wait, you just hit upon something absolutely crucial to this whole discussion, it seems to me. That the conceptualization of the Jew as the "enemy," has to precede this, in fact, and that it is wrong to say that it is different, you know, from massacres in wartime for this reason.

DE: Exactly. What you can say is that extermination in the case of the Germans was preceded by ruling out the Jews from a German nation, which the Jews, themselves, thought of themselves totally as being patriotic Germans, you know, as being assimilated, specifically in Germany.

MG: It's not only they're the ones you mentioned; they are the enemies.

DE: Yeah. Well, they are sub-human, they are non-German, not part of the German nation, like the Turks now, Islam, even though they had lived there for centuries, and they are fully integrated and so forth, nevertheless, they are non-Germans. They are not real citizens. It's a change in citizen-ship status. And third, they are not only non-Germans, but they are enemies of the Germans.

MG: Was that one of the earliest things, by the way, to take away citizenship?

DE: Yes, Cooper's point, by the way, is that I think it didn't start with the Germans, that there was an earlier process which was crucial to the development of genocide,

which was of arbitrarily manipulating citizenship, to deciding who is a citizen and who is not citizen.

MG: That you are not a member of this nation.

DE: Merely being born in a place is not enough to qualify. And the...I forget how it worked, but there became a process that was not purely German, of sort of defining classes of citizenship. Related to passports, \_\_\_\_\_.

MG: The process is you are not a member of this nation; you are not a citizen of this country, you are progressively \_\_\_\_\_, ok, an enemy. Ok. That is very interesting.

DE: Now why was this so dangerous to the Jews?

DE: Actually this is a very interesting point, because this was in fact and from a certain perspective of the time, could have been seen to be very dangerous to the Jews.. Please remember, by the way, that the Jews were very smart. They were not defined by a peculiar social blindness, a peculiar ability to perceive themselves, and yet a vast majority of Jews failed to infer from all these measures, that they were going to be exterminated. That fact, alone, is enough to absolve, in a certain sense, or to \_\_\_\_\_, most of the Germans.

MG: If the Jews didn't...

DE: If the Jews couldn't figure out, it would be quite wrong to suppose that the Germans should easily have figured it out. In fact, it would be quite natural for them to take their main cue from the reaction of the Jews themselves. Ah, if the Jews aren't acting as though they expect to be exterminated, what better evidence could you have?

MG: Of course, you have to ask when are we talking about.

DE: Well this right through. So this country wouldn't believe...the Jews in general \_\_\_\_\_, in the Warsaw Ghetto, didn't believe they were facing the gas, until the gas was turned on. So, right there, that really is a large part of the answer to Weiseger (?), in a way. You could say "Who did believe this?" It wasn't just the Germans. The Americans couldn't believe it when they were told it- American Jews or non-Jews. So, now...

MG: I must say, I found it pretty hard to believe.

DE: Now let me tell you. Here is something, now, that is quite important, \_\_\_\_\_. What I'm saying, that the element that is crucial in the nuclear part, but also to the earlier, is a willingness for a variety of purposes to use the threat or actual action of massacre as an instrument of policy. And I particularly say that for purposes other than the prevention of massacre...notice that if you use the threat in order to prevent massacre, or to end it, you know, I won't explain that but...well, in general... to some extent the notion of reserves, which I was involved with, of maintaining reserves in nuclear war, like \_\_\_\_\_, has the exclusive purpose in my mind, at the time, of making it possible to end a nuclear war by threatening, by having something to threaten.

MG: In the Livermore peoples' mind, it has the function of maintaining control of the world.

DE: You mean, if the Russians got it.

MG: No.

DE: Or if we got it?

MG: That we should maintain the reserve...

DE: Yeah alright. You mean after the war, or...

MG: Well during the war, we should hold back on certain numbers of nuclear weapons and they presume that the Russians will too, but that we should hold back more something, so we have more control of the world.

DE: If this is in our plans now, I have as much role in the idea of maintaining, the actual effect of maintaining a strategic reserve. In the history of the planet, I probably have more influence on that than any other individual. Um, but the interest for me, in particular was, what other way would there be to get a war ended unless you can threaten that if you don't end it, it will get worse for you. You haven't experienced everything.

MG: You ain't see nothing yet.

DE: Yeah it's not true that you have nothing to lose, at this point. But anyway, I was trying...to get the war ended as quickly as possible. Now what I am saying is that that perspective is c...or another way is to say well, that perspective is consistent with a desire, literally, to avert any use of nuclear weapons, or to minimize the risk or the scale of the use of nuclear weapons. Other purposes cannot be said to be consistent with the desire to totally avert or to minimize the use of nuclear weapons, because they contemplate using nuclear weapons, first, in cases where if you didn't use them, otherwise, they wouldn't get used. You're not expecting they would be used otherwise, unless you use them for these purposes. And your purposes do not include minimizing the risk of other wars. So now we're talking about use of these weapons where your intention is not to minimize, but possibly to increase the use or the scale of use of nuclear weapons, in order to achieve certain other purposes , which are \_\_\_\_\_, to avert evils which are regarded as even worse, or whatever.

(CUT)



DE: Now why...now the Jews, although they did not realize it, were in great danger, by being defined as non-German nationals, and as being defined as national enemies, enemies of the German people. The danger that they were in was that as enemies of the German people, war would be made against them. They would be regarded as being at war. And indeed, this ...Hitler used that metaphor continuously. You know, that this is a war basically at... there was a war. The extermination in the 40's was regarded as a war within a war. But even in the 30's there was basically a war going on between the Jews and the rest of humanity and especially the Arians.

MG: Did he say that like that?

DE: I'm sure that he did use that metaphor a lot. And just as we commonly speak of a war on poverty, a war on disease and all that. So, his preparing the Germans for war against the Jews, clearly. Now these are initially Germans, but they are now being defined as non-Germans. They are losing their citizenship. Something that had not appeared in first...up until that time, was what non-combatants, that is, civilians, enemy nationals, were subject to. Strictly, we are not talking about something invented by the Germans or by Hitler, and certainly which does not start with the Holocaust. And I am talking now about the deliberate wartime or non-wartime annihilation of civilians- I am talking about that. I am saying that was not invented by Hitler or by the Germans, and certainly didn't start with the evolution. Well, one can say, first...possibly, one of the earliest is the genocide of the Armenians, by the Turks, about which we are having this debate at this very time, with again Reagan unwilling to draw attention to the fact that our current ally, the Turks, were guilty of genocide. AS they were. And that is probably the first clear-cut example in this century. Then you have basically a willingness to exterminate in Russia, with

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both the peasants, the so-called \_\_\_\_\_, and then  
the enormous purges of the party and the army. And remember  
it is the apparatus that is basically subject to this. But  
with the families becoming second class citizens as well...

MG: They come back though...

DE: Yeah ok. So we have the Russians...

(CUT...END TAPE III)

BEGIN SIDE IV

DE: What the Jews were...what might be in store for the Jews, once they became defined as a national enemy of the Germans in wartime, was actually foreshadowed by the Japanese bombing of Shang-Hai and in Manchuria, which we protested enormously. Then by Guernica in Spain...what Reagan has just defined as the "right side," in Spain. And then by one could say, with a good deal of ambiguity, it was regarded- in fact the Germans themselves tried to imply that it was Warsaw, and Rotterdam- although these are a little out of the, the \_\_\_\_\_...there is a distinction that can be made, but in this context it isn't necessary. The fact is that civilians were killed from the air in Warsaw and Rotterdam and in fair numbers. By the way, the number which told the British that the wraps were off, the number they were led to believe was that 30,000 people had been killed in Rotterdam. That's quite a large number of people. That is as many as were killed in combat. Americans were killed in combat in Vietnam. The actual number is about 800. They didn't kill 30,000 in Rotterdam; they killed 800 in Rotterdam. That's a pretty large difference. It means that as many were killed in Rotterdam as Kali (?) killed in Milan. Or as the SS division killed at \_\_\_\_\_ in Rhone village.

MG: I am missing something here. Now wait a minute. 800, you mean, not 800,000 people.

DE: Instead of 30,000.

MG: Ok, so now what's the ...

DE: I'm saying British regarded their strategic bombing as justified in large part by Rotterdam. Strictly speaking, Rotterdam killed far fewer people than was imagined at the time.

MG: You mean this was deliberately changed?

DE: Hard to know. It's just that the reports at the time said 30,000. But in any case there was then, in 1940, that same year...Warsaw is '39. Then in '40, now, ...it was in '39, just before the Polish campaign, in about August, Hitler did make a speech, in which he said, in the course of a long speech, "If you, by your obduracy and by your policies insist to leave us no alternative but war, if you make war necessary, the Jews of Europe will not survive this war."

MG: Was that in September of '39?

DE: Well, it couldn't have been September because he launched the attack on September 1. It must have been August. Interestingly it was in August that Herbert Hoover proposed, in a large speech, a pact on no bombing by either side, and no blockade, that these banned. And it was on the first on September that FDR called on all belligerents to eschew the bombing of civilian population, which Hitler immediately agreed to.

MG: He agreed?

DE: To a degree they did play to them for the next year or so. Because...

MG: Well that was that they called the "Phony War?"

DE: Yeah, but Hitler was very consciously trying to deter the British from doing that, and had very strong controls on...nobody was to bomb London without his personal approval. And London was bombed one night, apparently by accident, and against his and the guy in charge of the raid was disciplined for it. By Hitler. But the British took that as a deliberate attack which was the justification for their attack and so forth. Now, thus, in 1940, after Warsaw but with Rotterdam, and then with the attacks on Germany, and then the attacks

on Berlin and then for the first time on a big scale, the attacks on London, by Germany. Now, this is the Battle of Britain, in the fall of 1940, Now you have on-- this is definitely for the first time-- on a major city, a major attack on a civilian population. Soon followed by Coventry, and the reaction of Bomber Harris, who later became head of the British airforces \_\_\_\_\_, was precisely this is the way to do it. Meaning, very specifically, indiscriminate bombing throughout the cities is the way for maximum disorganization, maximum loss of economic, rather than aiming at factories.

MG: This is the most efficient way?

DE: It was technical decision. We shouldn't try to aim at the factories, you should spread it out widely over the city and basically at housing.

MG: When was this said?

DE: I forget the exact month of Coventry, but it would be either December '40, or January '41.

MG: That was a public statement? No.

DE: No, no, this was his private conclusion on which he based later planning. And Britain then, in February of '42, adopted as their official main use of their airforces...this is immediately after the fall of Singapore- so you see here is this pattern, of revenge basically- but the week of the fall of Singapore, they adopted the official policy secretly of targeting workers and housing in Germany, not only as the major target of their airforces but thus as their major operation of the war, because it is all they could do. This you remember is only the same month as Hitler's



deciding on the final solution. So what I am saying now is that this was a practice that was evolving in the late 30's, first perhaps started with the Japanese and then by the Germans in Spain and then in practice by the Germans and British. All well before the killing of Jews, even on the Russian front. See the Russians don't get attacked until mid- '41. So all of this is before any...and right away they begin killing Jews in Russia, in mobile operations by machine groups first, and then by mobile gassing. But all of that is after Coventry, after Guernica, after the battle of Britain. So is there a connection? What I am saying is, first of all, in practice, the killing of the Jews is preceded by two very clear-cut precursors. One is the killing of racially defective people in the euthenasia program. Non-Jews, essentially. This is a fairly large-scale thing- sterilization and euthenasia. Of defectives....of mentally retarded people. And that's what Lifton(?) is looking into a lot now. That is a clear...that involved the medical profession widely, in this process of purifying the race. Well, that's a very clear-cut precursor. But it's not addressed to Jews initially. By the way, they also started sterilizing the gypsies early on. Then the other precursor is bombing of civilian populations in wartime. It had not happened on any perceptible scale in the heart of Europe, against white people in other words except the only thing was Spain, which...remember the impression that was made on Hemingway, for example, was "This was murder. I am for killing in war and I have nothing against it, and I am for killing in revolution; that can be a military matter, but this is murder." And this is his dispatch from Spain, which was published where? And so it is hidden for forty years... in Praavda. It was a dispatch for Praavda. So, the Jews, in fact, one can say historically- and some people could have made this connection at the time- when war comes, civilians are going to be the target, enemy civilians. And the Jews had become enemies of the German people, and in wartime they're in for it. They get killed, not merely segregated. And I say, what would lead to that hypothesis? Not merely

the characteristics of Germans...Now, one could say, "Well, it was Germans who did this, first of all, now wasn't it?" Ah, but the theory on which they were doing it was not primarily a German theory. It was primarily an Italian, British, American theory, which the Germans did not really pick up as the theory. Hitler in fact didn't prepare for it and Hitler didn't believe in it too much as a theory of how to wage a war. His whole ideology permitted it, but he didn't think it was effective enough. Basically-

MG: You mean mainly going after non-combatants?

DE: Going after non-combatants as a direct target. So although the practice turned out to be largely an Axis practice, initially, followed very quickly by the British, the fact is that British preparations for this kind of warfare long preceded German preparations. And American preparations preceded American preparations; we just didn't get into the war as quickly. And the roots, in other words, as a way of waging war go back and to the last part of the first World War, as a theory. The preparations go throughout the 20's, and 30's, in Britain and America. So, all pretty secretly, the public was certainly not aware of this kind of thinking. But in fact the U.S. was making heavy bombers as its preparations from the war, and it turned out, effectively, its way of getting out of the depression. What got us out of the depression in '39 and '40 was war spending, which was, above all, bomber building. It was also tank building. But bomber and some ship building. But bomber building, in particular was going to be our major contribution. And the bombers we were building were heavy bombers for long-range bombardment. Now, there's a particular characteristic. The strategic bombardment is bombardment of the enemy's homeland. But there are specific reasons why it is associated with massacre. In part, that is because the theory calls for massacre, but there is a difference here. Some people said you shouldn't massacre; you would hit factories very precisely, like hitting

the crates in Nicaragua. In fact, high level bombing, the strategic bombing, long distance bombing, turns out to be capable only of massacre. Until perhaps very recently, if that's not true, it has become true only in the last few years with "smart bombs."

MG: Where does your friend the Englishman come in here?

DE: Trenchard and then later Harris. Well, Trenchard was head of the airforce, going back to the first World War. The airforces and so...let's make a quick point here. That to speak of long distance bombing, which is bombing which goes over the trench lines, you are going, in effect, to accomplish massacre. The reason is this. It has to be done at rather high altitude for two reasons: high altitude uses less fuel, and to go long distances you have to go at high altitude. The air is richer at the lower altitudes and you use more fuel when you fly low. So, to cover longer distance, you go at higher altitudes. Not super high, because that takes a lot of fuel to get up there. But to go at... you have to fly at a pretty high altitude if you're going to cover relatively long distances. High altitude is necessarily going to be inaccurate, especially when combined with speed. And again, speed of these planes, as opposed to say your slow, hovering capability of a zeppelin, is necessary against air defenses. At both anti-aircraft guns, later rockets, and fighter planes. All of those things require speed. When you drop bombs at high speed from a high altitude, especially through cloud cover, but even without cloud cover, you are inevitably going to hit within a very large area. You can't make your attacks precise. Early on, some Americans thought they could make them precise, so long distance bombing against defenses is inevitably going to kill mainly civilians. Whatever your initial intent is, quickly they learned that they might as well aim at the civilians, and do that better,

because it is all that they could do anyway. It is all that they could kill. So, the point is that the theory of strategic bombing was primarily a ...(INTERRUPTION)...so, a strategy of strategic bombing was- although not recognized before the war as such by everybody- was a strategy of massacre, of civilians. And that was primarily a British and American strategy, although the Germans, without having that as a strategy beforehand, effectively improvised it for the Battle of Britain, and earlier for the bombardment of Warsaw and Rotterdam. And so they were really first to practice it, but they weren't first to prepare for it or to consider it. And...not to exonerate them. But it was in no way peculiarly German. If anything, it was to the contrary. And the ...and that strategy...I am not sure that this point has ever been made...the existence of that strategy as a resultant of let's say four factors that come immediately to mind. As a result of the first, the slaughter of military, the indecisive slaughter of military and stalemate in the first World War. Second, the development of technology for long-range bombardment, capable essentially only of massacre, the precursor to which, by the way, was the long-distance artillery, also rather inaccurate. Such as Big Bertha.

MG: That was supposed to end all wars...

DE: Yeah, well. Uh, third, the mobilization of societies for war, which is an aspect of both nationalism from the French Revolution, and increasingly of industrialization, which thus makes war workers and the society as a whole a somewhat plausible target for wartime operations, as being implicated in war. As a target. And fourth, the mobilization for war and industrialization, which made war prone to stalemate. Very hard to defeat a modern nation, as turned up in WWI, and thus, encouraging desperate and brutal alternatives. So these



So these are processes that go back at least...well, in an important way to the French Revolution, where again the element of nationality becomes very important, being ...not only as in mobilization of one's own patriotic effort, but as a denigration of other nationalities, of an emphasis on differentness. An enlarging of identity...

MG: Why does that only go back to that?

DE: Well, a sense of nationality is often traced in particular to the French Revolution.

MG: No, I mean, doesn't that go much earlier than that?

DE: Not so much... Remember the basically...certainly the combination of nationalism, with, for example, conscription, is very precisely the French Revolution. The nation in arms...

MG: Never mind, don't pursue it.

DE: I think that the French Revolution is to be regarded as a very important episode in the development of nationalism. Remember that the era of absolute...kings, before that, and even earlier, feudalism. Before the French Revolution the king as...does have this feudal aspects, where there are elements of loyalty to a person, loyalty to the king, much more than your allegiance, your loyalties, your identity, are defined more by the relation to a certain social heirarchy less than by existence within a certain territory, a nation, or a common culture or a common...more of a common allegiance to a semi-divine king and \_\_\_\_\_. Or, more locally, to a local feudal lord. So the idea, then, of nationality being defined territorially, and socially and ethnically, is not much before the French Revolution. Remember there is no German nation at that time, just a collection of principalities.



For almost a century later. Also, it is only around that time that Italy gets united as a nation.

MG: Don't stay with it.

DE: So here we have a number of elements, but all of which and most immediately leading up to a willingness after the massacres of military, which seemed to make the notion of just war look pretty hollow as a limitation on bombs, a willingness to contemplate the use of modern technology which is adapted, above all, to massacre. That is air-borne technology...to the purpose of avoiding WWI. Just as the nuclear weapon offers itself to avoid WWII, to avoid a replay of WWII, the bombing plane, before that, offered itself as a way to avoid the replay of WWI. Which it did do, to a large extent. It was a way of avoiding the stalemate of WWI. The slaughter of military.

MG: How many people were killed in WWI?

DE: Well, I was going to say 60 million, but that is a figure for WWII. The question is whether it is similar to uh...no, no I tell you, I know the answer. There were 65 million under arms in WWI, all around the world. 13 million were killed. Almost entirely military.

MG: Much higher than I would have begun to guess.

DE: So you have 13 million, mostly military killed, almost entirely military. The...and again, you have more than that killed in Russia alone in WWII, mostly civilians.

MG: Like 35?

DE: No, 20. So, to deter that from happening again, to prevent that, or to win the war basically, to get it over with quickly, the idea was kill a small number of civilians.

By the way, why doesn't the theory work? Because it turns out that A) it didn't deter Hitler, nor did it lead Hitler or the Germans to give up. It turns out there is a lot of ruin in the nation, and the nation can live and keep fighting with a tremendous amount of massacre. Just as the Vietnamese were not about to quit. And the notion that dictators back down when challenged, because they calculate the odds carefully, they understand strength and they back down, does apply to Russia. It did not apply to Hitler, and in fact, it defines a major difference from Hitler. Nothing could be more dangerous than the notion that if...if there is a wrong inference in all of history, it is the inference that if Chamberlain had stood tight in Munich, there would have been no war. That is as wrong as an inference could be. There would have been war, as he thought, and whether it would have been better to have the war then or later is a hard question to answer. It would have been better in some ways and worse in other ways. And very conjectural. But that there would have been war is virtually certain. As Hitler said, "My enemies do not want...fear war, but I want war." And, again a major difference, between the Russians and the Nazi's, known to any expert on Russia, especially if they know anything about the Nazi's as well. Namely that the German fascist philosophy, like the Italian, and to some degree the Japanese, extolled war in a great variety of ways, and militarism as a great value and a glory and a test of a nation, something which, in itself, had no part of Russian or communist philosophy. One could say until the Second World War, where, not they learned to like war then, but certainly a major aspect of the legitimacy of the Communist party now is its effectiveness as a wartime leader.

MG: No, but you know the \_\_\_\_\_ and the popular culture...

DE: Well again totally...against, against, war, as is true

in Germany and Japan now, for that matter. I mean, they have the war...

MG: But it is not nearly so militant, it seems to me, in ordinary conversation. People you run into in the subway in Frankfurt, or in Tokyo, or in \_\_\_\_\_saka. Don't start talking about war.

DE: No, that's for sure, but the justification of readiness for war, as being...and just truistically necessary...probably pacifism and probably Russia is one of the least places in the whole world for non-defense, for pacifist...less, if anything, than the Japanese. The Germans, who rely on the U.S. to protect them, basically, would rather not be part of it. But the Russias know that they have to rely on themselves and there is simply total acceptance of that. So...ok. But should the Germans have understood- the public- that this was the way things are going? Should the Jews have understood it? I am saying that in the 30's, and up to the 40's, there was simply no historical precedent for this. You didn't do this to enemy civilians. Alright, we are enemies, but we are civilians.

MG: You don't do it to enemy civilians.

DE: You don't do it to enemy civilians. They weren't aware that they were heading toward a war in which you did to it to enemies. The truth is, you did do it to enemy civilians. And the world, to this day, doesn't understand that this is the change that had taken place in the thinking of major parts of their establishments and their elites, secretly, and unknown to them, not in WWII, but long before WWII. And then became totally enthroned in WWII, first as a practice- it's what we did, it's what my friends did, it's what my father did- that might have had the counter-current of a growing sense that it hadn't worked in WWII, except for two things. It is common to say the atom bomb as having validated the

theory for the future. Alright, it didn't work in WWII very well, but now it will work, because of the atom bomb. A less realized, very important fact-

MG: Now wait a minute. I missed the meaning of that last-

DE: Ok. The strategic bombing survey, of which Nizza (?) was a key part, is well-known to have concluded that the bombing was not crucial to the ending, winning of the war in Germany.

MG: Talking about the atomic bomb.

DE: No, no, I'm saying that the strategic bombing had not actually worked. This process, just as a process and a practice, was likely to go on after WWII, just because they had done it, and they had big institutions ready to do it and so forth. Still, there was a counter-current, and that was that there was strong evidence that it had not been effective, after all. It had not led...it had not justified the hopes or the beliefs.

MG: What do you mean not been effective?

DE: It hadn't not only won the war, it hadn't contributed much to winning the war in Germany. German production went up not down. They didn't surrender. The ground invasion was necessary, and in fact critical, after all. At most, it had supplemented beyond the ground invasion and even, to some significant degree, it had done that. But to a much less degree than anyone had supposed. And whether it was worth the money or the effort of the number of people of lost, it was very questionable. The British actually lost a very large number of educated elite pilots. And crews. By large numbers I mean something like 20,000. They lost an enormous number. It was generally calculated that in terms of the economic effort that went into the bombing...building the planes, the bombers, the factories, training the pilots



and the numbers of troops and everything, that the economic value of the bombing effort on the British side was greater than the value destroyed on the German side. So, that didn't look too economical. That was an attrition process at which you were at the wrong end of the attrition. The...so, but, then, two things happened at the end of the war that confirmed that these criticisms were not lessons to be drawn. And that the bombing program was alright. The atom bomb did promise to be as effective as they had earlier hoped high explosives would be. But there was another lesson that is almost never mentioned, which was at least as important. And that was that the bombing of Japan was effective. Prior to the atom bomb. That is often obscured by the fact that the strategic bombing surveys deprecated the need for the atom bomb itself, as they had deprecated the effectiveness of strategic bombing in Germany. But the reason the atom bomb was not needed in Japan according to strategic bombing survey, was that Napalm had already done the job and was capable of winning the war itself.

MG: What was used in Tokyo?

DE: They used Napalm, white phosphorous, particularly, they used large numbers of little incendiary bombs, thermite bombs.

MG: That's what made the big firestorm stuff?

DE: Yeah, but they also used Napalm. And...in the end. So, that had done the job. So strategic bombing had been effective in Japan. But you will rarely hear that. But that really was very important in the post-war thinking of the...

MG: You mean how to assess the kill power?

DE: A major reason was that they didn't really beat the defenses in Germany, up til the very end of the war.



But in Japan they did beat the defenses, so they were able to launch a much heavier weight at the time. And it...

MG: Are you saying that therefore that was an argument used by them? That they don't need...that they didn't need the atomic bomb?

DE: Yeah, that argument is used. Even people like LaMay thought that the atomic bomb was not necessary, because he had done the job already, and that was true, that was basically true. Other factors, of course, the blockade was also a major factor. But the two together, the blockade and the... bombing. So the point then is that long before WWII, outside Germany, a willingness to massacre for a variety of national purposes, in wartime, including enemy civilians- that's what I mean by massacre- as a wartime measure had gotten very elite acceptance. It has also got in the course of the war, widespread U.S. public acceptance, with much less awareness or consciousness, but on the whole general acceptance of the idea. That meant that enemy civilians are in trouble in wartime, even if those enemy civilians used to be regarded as your own co-nationals. And in fact what was so unusual in Germany was precisely the progressive, re-defining of Germans, certain Germans, as non-Germans and enemy.

MG: As no longer Germans, and therefore enemies. No longer your co-nationals.

DE: It meant that you were willing to do to these people-

MG: See this is on the whole psuedo-speciation theory.

DE: Yeah, that's right. You were willing to do to these people, in particular in revenge, what your other national enemies were already doing to you from the air. And German civilians in general, to the extent they got glimmerings that there might be something horrible being done to the Jews...

this was in a context when the British and the Americans were already doing it to us, so why should the Jews be exempt? You are less concerned; you are less focused on other people's problems. But all of this...

MG: I swear the bombing of those people in Philadelphia is related to this.

DE: Oh well, the idea of bombing is of course...in general, Americans have an acceptance of bombing, which is peculiar in the whole world, to this day.

MG: Well according to Praavda...

DE: You are absolutely at the forefront of willingness...

MG:.....it is the absolute first in the history of humanity, that anybody should be bombing their ghettos.

DE: I think that is pretty close to it. That probably is a turning point, and this was the country to expect it in. That if anybody was going to start bombing...the nearest to it was Somoza's deliberate bombing of the cities in the last days of his reign with, of course, American supplied bombs and airplanes, when he actually bombed his cities fairly indiscriminately as the punishment for the the successful uprisings in a series of cities. He did do it right at the very last. He ended in May of 1979. The big uprising which failed was a series of urban uprisings, holding a number of cities against him, in something like September of '78. It was undercover. And...\_\_\_\_\_came in '77 and this was in '78. And as a result, and basically as a punishment of those cities, he sent his airforce, deliberately, over those cities, to bomb fairly indiscriminately. So he was bombing his own cities. And that was regarded as something as a first. And then he continued to do that, until he left.

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MG: By the way, all this intelligence has helped stop him (?).

DE: This is what Reagan regards as the right side of Nicaragua. So that was very unusual.

MG: Aren't you curious how I know all this about what was in Praavda about Philadelphia?

DE: In the paper. I've been seeing it in the paper.

MG: Oh was it in the paper? Oh, I didn't know that, because I got it from our special bank of secret teletype lines, newslines at Livermore.

DE: Oh! They tell you what is in Praavda?

MG: Right.

DE: So, actually, the use...see, there are a number of little firsts here. The use...the first use...we used, of course, teargas, from the air, in Vietnam, along with herbicide. But in 1969, possibly the first use of airborne teargas, was used by who...then governor of this state. Ronald Reagan at our local university here. When he used helicopters in order to spread teargas which spread a fuck (?), needless to say, all over the campus, including the Hoover Institution- ah no, that is at Stanford. But all over the campus. And a lot of people got teargassed with these airborne use of teargas, which was straight from Vietnam. And that was Reagan. Um, but you could foresee that...

MG: He's been practicing a while hasn't he?

DE: Yeah. So, well, I'll tell you one other thing that Reagan was involved in very actively as a governor. Of all things, that was exposed by a guy named Rod Reidenaller (?) in some underground press papers. It was called Garden Plant (?)

Exercise, which was an exercise of state militia's in a number of states in combination with the U.S. Army, essentially to take over a state government. In military emergency against anti-war and student uprising. And Reagan as governor was a major actor in the development of this planning for the military take-over of a country, to prevent against...you can be quite sure that those plans have been developed to the fucking last \_\_\_\_\_ under our current President, if not before. I mean, they know, what camp oughta go in, by name, I'm sure, at this point. Um, so, remember though, the public does have this impression still...they have considerably accepted wartime massacre in the face...in the form of bombing...they make a great distinction in their minds from the extermination, the holocaust, because they think of that as a domestic operation. Non-military. Actually, it was done against-

MG: That is right, against individuals, is what they think..

DE: Well, individuals, Christ.

MG: But there was one by one, custom tailored massacre, you know .

DE: Well as in Milan, as in Indonesia. The only difference there is it is not high-technology. It's on lists.

MG: This is the most efficient technology for the purpose.

DE: Yeah, as by lists. And the people who were rounded in Chile when Pinochet took over were on computer lists. The people who were killed in Indonesia, were in computerized lists coming from the American CIA. In Indonesia. And that is admitted by the CIA themselves. So the American people, in other words, think of it as wartime. They don't think of that as a wartime. They think that it would have happened even if

there had been no war. That is probably wrong.

MG: That seems likely wrong, doesn't it?

DE: Yeah, that they just...the Germans wouldn't have gotten... that was a real threshold that had to be crossed. But it was a threshold that made it much easier for them to be \_\_\_\_\_, by the example that they were not only carrying out, but were suffering massacre from the air. And they didn't see the big difference. It was in war; it's what you do in wartime. The...and what we're gonna kill in wartime is our local enemies. So, the characteristic of our actual nuclear planning, now, has been to...a willingness to expand this aspect of modern warfare into nuclear massacre as being something that we are willing to initiate-

MG: Under certain circumstances.

DE: Well no, in any war we find our troops, or our close ally troops, involved. A war in any circumstances under which there is no clear tactical military alternative. Where we are willing to do this now to avoid not just nuclear war, but to avoid a capture or tactical defeat of a sizeable U.S. or allied \_\_\_\_\_.

MG: Alright. You know what? You just put your finger on here which I wish that you would sharpen in this article or book or whatever this is going to become and that is, that whereas, it seems to me, at least popularly, the concept of deterrence really refers only to the huge lobs over of huge amounts of stuff from one or the other and it does not involve what you have just outlined here in one sentence, that it is considered to be the thing to do if there is no clear alternative, like, you know, in the mid-East, or Nicaragua, and in Europe for sure, you know. That is not clear to people, meaning...



DE: Oh well, now, there are two things. First of all, this is not only true in preventing the take-over of Western Europe, where again many people would be willing to accept this risk, and would not regard themselves as equivalent to the Germans of either the 30's or the 40's. That is, the Germans of segregation or the Germans of extermination, in so doing. Uh, but it does in fact go well beyond that, and the public doesn't understand this, and because they don't understand it, should not be morally or harangued or condemned as if they did understand it. And that is first in wartime, two things: in wartime, the U.S. is ready, physically and in planning, and in actual commitments to initiate nuclear operations which by their nature will almost certainly quickly evolve into massacre, wide, big, massacre of unprecedented scale. Second, and this does, in fact, have strong relation to what was done to the Jews, although that is not easily assimilated by people.

MG: There has to be a way to make that connection. Excuse me-

DE: Well, because to see it, you have to see either that the Jews was a wartime operation or that there isn't that major difference between a wartime operation and a non-wartime. But the public, in fact, in their ethics, have absorbed now, the notion that there is a big difference between wartime and non-wartime massacre and second, that it...that the Jews were a non-wartime massascre.

MG: I think there is a point here that is very hard to get.

DE: That makes is hard to see the relevance of the Holocaust for people.

MG: Well, even let's leave the Holocaust out. What I am really saying now is the difference between the sort of amorphous concept of deterence, and what you just said, I think has got to be sharpened. I think it has to be sharpened

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even in the minds of these Livermore people. Because when I ask Richard Garwin, "So, under what circumstances would you drop a nuclear weapon?" He said, and I told you this, he said, "Well, you know," the big whole thing, "that if in fact a conventional war began and the Russians, you know, bla bla bla and then wer were up against it and so on, I would drop one bomb on a non- you know, civilian target, on a water tank or something like that. And I said, "That's what you would do? And you think it would stop at that?" And he said, "Oh well, of course it would \_\_\_\_\_"

DE: They would...

END OF SIDE IV.